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MISNAMED, MISAPPLIED, AND MISGUIDED: CLARIFYING
THE STATE OF SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND
PROPOSING A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE DOCTRINE
Jess D. Mekeel*
INTRODUCTION
While American military and intelligence forces continue to wage,' and the
American media continues to incessantly cover,' the global war on terrorism,
popular attention has shifted away from a war closer to home - the war on drugs.'
Nevertheless, the war on drugs, as well as the war on other crimes, is waged on a
daily basis. In fact, the United States government spends over $40 billion per year
on the drug war, yet drugs continue to threaten American society and carry both
human and monetary costs.4 Law enforcement targeted at suppliers remains "the
dominant [policy] lever in the United States,"5 and government officials continually
* B.A., Political Science and Peace, War, and Defense, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, 2004; J.D., College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 2006.
I am grateful to the editors and staff members of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
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I also am indebted to Jack Barnwell for allowing me to assist in the State v. Foster appeal,
and to Kathleen Baldwin, Bill Hart, and Paul Marcus for providing invaluable research and
writing instruction in the dynamic field of criminal law. Finally, I wish to express my sincere
gratitude for the enduring love, patience, and support of my parents, Harold and Maria Mekeel,
and Lara Whittaker. All mistakes in this Note remain my own.
See 4 Terrorists Killed in U.S. Missile Strike, CNN.com, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.cnn.
com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/01/17/pakistan.strike.ap/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
2 For example, a search for the phrase "war on terrorism" in New York Times articles from
January 1, 2003 until January 1, 2006 resulted in 819 hits.
3 The same kind of search yielded only eighty-nine hits for "war on drugs," although
naturally, I recognize that this is far from a perfect method of measuring media coverage.
A possible exception to the trend in coverage of the drug war has been the media obses-
sion with the use of steroids and human growth hormones in professional sports. See, e.g.,
Media Advisory, Comm. on Gov't Reform, Media Coverage for March 17 Hearing into
Steroids in Major League Baseball, STATES NEws SERVICE, Mar. 15,2005 (on file with author)
("[W]e anticipate more requests for coverage than there are seats in the hearing room."). Steroid
use in athletics and the credibility of home run records, however, is a far cry from the national
narcotics problem.
' Jonathan Caulkins & Robert MacCoun, Analyzing Illicit Drug Markets When Dealers
Act With Limited Rationality, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 315,
315 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005) ("[D]rugs create about $100 billion per
year in quantifiable social costs.").
5Id.
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adopt new and creative strategies for catching offenders and protecting American
citizens. One of the more common means of investigating and detecting criminal
behavior has been through the use of sting operations.6 Whether posing as drug
dealers and purchasers on the streets7 or as innocent and vulnerable children on the
Internet, s government officials frequently work undercover to root out and prosecute
criminals in a variety of settings.
Such police methods have not gone unchallenged, however, particularly when
used in the context of rigid, if not mandatory, sentencing laws.9 In North Carolina,
for example, Michael Washington, a ten-year veteran of the police force and three-
year veteran of the narcotics unit, arranged, with the assistance of a confidential
informant, the sale of one ounce of cocaine for $800.00, ° a "trafficking amount" of
the substance." The target of the reverse sting and the ultimate purchaser was Alvin
Terrill Foster, Jr. 2 According to testimony at trial, Washington and the confidential
informant planned to sell the ounce of cocaine for $800.00, receiving $500.00 at the
time of the exchange and "fronting" the remaining $300.00 until a later date. 13 At
the predetermined location, the defendant got in the car with the undercover agent
and confidential informant, was handed a plastic bag containing cocaine, and was
shown a scale that he could use to weigh the drugs.'4 Because the plastic bag that
the defendant had purchased contained 32.2 grams of powder cocaine, he was arrested
and convicted for trafficking cocaine instead of simple possession. 5 The defendant
contended that he had never purchased more than five grams from the informant
before, that he was a user and not a dealer, and that in the transaction for which he
was arrested, he thought he was only purchasing five grams.'6 While the defendant
6 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (2d ed. 1986).
7 See Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States: Towards
a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1056-58
(1993) (differentiating traditional and reverse sting operations employed in the drug war).
8 See, e.g., InfoseekExecutivels Charged With Seeking Sexfrom Minor, N.Y.TIMES, Sept.
21, 1999, at CIO.
9 See Todd E. Witten, Note, Sentence Entrapment andManipulation: GovernmentManip-
ulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REv. 697, 697-98 (1996).
10 New Brief for the State 2-3, State v. Foster, 592 S.E.2d 259 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (No.
104PA04) (on file with author). As noted in the brief, "[a]n ounce equals 28.350 grams." Id.
at 7 n.2 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1341 (10th ed. 1997)).
" State v. Foster, 592 S.E.2d 259, 261 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
12 Id.
13 See id.
" See id. There was conflicting testimony as to whether the defendant used the scale: the
defendant testified that he never weighed the drugs, while Detective Washington testified that
he showed the defendant the measured weight when the defendant placed the cocaine on the
scale. Compare id., with id. at 262.
'" See id. at 261.
16 See id. at 262.
1584 [Vol. 14:1583
MISNAMED, MISAPPLIED, AND MISGUIDED
did not raise the claim at trial, the appellate court sua sponte addressed the issue of
sentencing entrapment 7 and concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new trial
at which he could present the defense.'
Between 1996 and 1998, academia produced a number of articles addressing the
quagmire of "sentencing entrapment" or "sentencing manipulation."' 19 A plethora of
definitions have been employed to describe this controversial defense. 20 Many courts
have struggled with this doctrine, including the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
which was unable to come to a definitive decision in reviewing the Court of Appeals'
decision in State v. Foster2' and, consequently, left the controversy surrounding the
doctrine unresolved in North Carolina.2 2 Because of the continuing confusion regar-
ding the contours and viability of sentencing entrapment, it is necessary to revisit this
troubling issue.
This Note will examine the different versions and the current status of sentencing
entrapment. Part U of this Note will provide a brief background necessary for an
understanding of sentencing entrapment. Particularly, the section will discuss the
historical development of the traditional entrapment defense and federal sentencing
laws, including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sen-
tences. Part mH will evaluate the current status of sentencing entrapment in the federal
circuits as well as various state courts. Part IV will examine the advantages and dis-
advantages of each version of sentencing entrapment. Part V will further examine
17 Id. at 264-65 (extending the defendant's claim of entrapment to the doctrine of
sentencing entrapment). Such a holding seemed to run counter to the North Carolina Supreme
Court's explanation of the entrapment defense as available only to "one who entertained no
prior criminal intent." State v. Love, 47 S.E.2d 712, 714 (N.C. 1948) (emphasis added).
" Foster, 592 S.E.2d at 265. In framing the sentencing entrapment issue, the court cited
United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003), wherein the Ninth Circuit held that
"'sentencing entrapment occurs when a defendant is predisposed to commit a lesser crime, but
is entrapped into committing a more significant crime that is subject to more severe punishment
because of government conduct."' Id. at 264 (quoting Si, 343 F.3d at 1128).
19 See, e.g., Joan Malmud, Comment, Defending a Sentence: The Judicial Establishment
of Sentencing Entrapment and Sentencing Manipulation Defenses, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1359
(1997); Jeff LaBine, Note, Sentencing Entrapment Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Activism or Interpretation?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1519 (1998); Suzanne Mitchell,
Note, Clarifying the United States Sentencing Guidelines' Focus on Government Conduct
in Reverse Sting Sentencing: Imperfect Entrapment as a Logical Incomplete Defense that
Warrants Departure, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 746 (1996); Witten, supra note 9.
20 See infra Part H (discussing judicial treatment of the separate doctrines).
21 604 S.E.2d 913,913 (N.C. 2004) (per curiam). One justice took no part in the decision,
and the remaining six were evenly divided on the issue. Id.
22 Despite being presented with the opportunity to resolve the issue of sentencing
entrapment, the court passed the buck, forcing the doctrine to eventually find its way once
again through the North Carolina legal system. Id. ("[Tihe decision of the Court of Appeals
is left undisturbed and stands without precedential value.").
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sentencing manipulation.' Ultimately, this Note will conclude that sentencing entrap-
ment should be rejected and that sentencing manipulation - provided it is carefully
construed, narrowly applied, and cabined by either an intent-based standard or a
market-based standard - is the more legitimate, desirable, and viable defense to a
contested sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Entrapment
The serpent deceived me, and I ate.24
Sentencing entrapment has often been described as an extension of the tradi-
tional defense of entrapment. 2' Entrapment, in turn, has been defined generally as
"[a] law-enforcement officer's or government agent's inducement of a person to
commit a crime, by means of fraud or undue persuasion, in an attempt to later bring
a criminal prosecution against that person." 6 The two concepts are distinct, as tradi-
tional entrapment is an affirmative defense to the substantive crime, and sentencing
entrapment is merely a defense to the sentence. Nevertheless, an adequate under-
standing of sentencing entrapment requires a brief discussion of the development
of the traditional defense of entrapment.
In 1932, the Supreme Court definitively established and defined the entrapment
defense in Sorrells v. United States.27 The defendant in Sorrells was arrested for vio-
lating the National Prohibition Act after selling whiskey to an undercover agent.
2 8
The defendant initially denied possessing any liquor after multiple requests by the
23 For purposes of uniformity, the phrase sentencing manipulation will be used instead
of what some courts have called "sentencing factor manipulation." While several states have
retained mandatory sentencing in accordance with their sentencing guidelines, the federal
system has returned to discretionary sentencing, at least for now. See infra note 68 and
accompanying text. Thus, in that context, the issue is no longer manipulating a sentencing
factor, which would have resulted in a pre-defined sentence, but rather, the issue is about
manipulating the end product - the sentence itself.
24 Genesis 3:13 (New Catholic ed.)
2 See Daniel L. Abelson, Comment, Sentencing Entrapment: An Overview andAnalysis,
86 MARQ. L. REv. 773, 779 (2003).
26 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (8th ed. 2004).
27 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Scholars often point to Woo Wai v. United States as the first
significant attempt at framing the entrapment issue. 223 F. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915) (revers-
ing a conviction for conspiracy to bring aliens into the United States because the government
had organized the operation and induced the defendants to commit the crime); see also PAUL
MARcus, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE § 1.03, at 11 (2d ed. 1995) ("It is clear that Woo Wai
marks the beginning of the modem doctrine of entrapment. . .
28 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 438.
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agent but finally yielded after the agent appealed to the bonds of men who served
in the same military unit during World War 1.29 The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction and found that the defense of entrapment exists "as a matter of law."3 °
Despite finding that the defendant in Sorrells had been entrapped, the Court was
deeply divided over the contours of the entrapment defense. Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Hughes adopted what has since become known as the "subjective test"
of entrapment.3 Such an approach focuses not on the actions of the government,
but on the predisposition of the defendant to commit the offense.32 The court may
remove the defendant's conduct from the reach of the criminal statute when "the
defendant is a person otherwise innocent,"" and the government prosecutes the
defendant "for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its
own officials."'  Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that Congress could not have
intended to place such a defendant within the reach of the criminal law, and thus,
convicting an entrapped defendant would constitute a "gross perversion"35 of legis-
lative intent.36 The Supreme Court has since consistently followed this subjective
approach to entrapment, and has held that "' [t]o determine whether entrapment has been
established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the
trap for the unwary criminal."' 37
An alternative approach to entrapment, however, has found substantial support
in concurring and dissenting opinions of the Court,3" as well as in numerous state
court opinions.39 This version of entrapment, often labeled the "objective test,"'
originated in Justice Roberts's dissent in Sorrells.4' Whereas the subjective approach
29 See id. at 439.
30 Id. at 452.
31 See MARCUS, supra note 27, § 1.06, at 14-15.
32 See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
33 Id.
34 Id.
15 Id. at 452.
36 See id. at 448-52.
[I]t was [not] the intention of the Congress in enacting [the National
Prohibition Act] that its processes of detection and enforcement should
be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part
of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and
to punish them.
Id. at 448.
37 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,429 (1973) (quoting Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)) (alteration in original).
38 See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,495-97 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
39 See, e.g., Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514, 521 (Alaska 1978); People v. Smith, 80 P.3d
662, 665 (Cal. 2003); State v. Reed, 881 P.2d 1218, 1228 (Haw. 1994), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Balanza, 1 P.3d 281 (Haw. 2000).
4 See MARCUS, supra note 27, § 1.06 at 19.
41 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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is focused on the predisposition of the defendant, the objective approach looks to
the actions of the government agents involved in the investigation.a2 Where the
government agents engage in wrongful conduct, as a matter of public policy, Roberts
argued that the Court should be able to use its supervisory power to invalidate the
resulting prosecution.4"
While the federal courts have continued to apply the subjective standard for entrap-
ment, there nevertheless have been attempts to utilize some of the elements of the
objective standard by evaluating claims of "outrageous governmental conduct."44
This is in large measure due to the increased use of reverse stings, a practice that
has attracted attention and often criticism from the courts.45 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has stated that even where predisposition is found and a defendant fails to
show entrapment, the defendant may still pursue a due process claim based on out-
rageous government conduct.46
These approaches 47 to entrapment have served as the underlying foundations for
the various versions of sentencing entrapment, a defense primarily created in re-
sponse to structured sentencing, particularly the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
42 Id. at 453-54. While not adopting the doctrine because of a conflict with state legis-
lation, the Supreme Court of Colorado noted that "commentators generally favor the objective
test." Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Colo. 1981).
43 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457-59 (Roberts, J., dissenting). "It is the province of the court and
of the court alone to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal
law." Id. at 457.
44 See Witten, supra note 9, at 714-15 (noting that the door for due process claims based
on outrageous governmental conduct was opened first in dicta in Russell and again in Hampton).
41 See, e.g., Leech v. State, 66 P.3d 987,991 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (Johnson, P.J., concur-
ring) ("The justice system should look with ajaundiced eye upon reverse sting operations. This
effectively is the justice system becoming involved in committing crime and not stopping it.").
6 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,489 (1976) (citing United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423,431-32 (1973)). The Due Process Clause was invoked as a result of government
misconduct most notably in the classic case Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In
Rochin, the police officers forcibly pumped the defendant's stomach in order to retrieve drugs
that he had ingested. See id. at 166. The Court held that such behavior by the government was
so shocking to the conscience that it violated substantive due process. See id. at 173.
'7 One scholar has suggested a third approach: a blending of the subjective and objective.
See Camp, supra note 7, at 1085-95.
The proposed standard, then, involves a three-step process that en-
compasses both the objective and subjective views of entrapment. In the
first step, the defendant must convince the court that some government
impropriety exists....
In the second step, the prosecution must offer proof that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the offense....
In [the] final step, the jury is charged with weighing the defendant's pre-
disposition against the government's misconduct, since the court already has
determined that both exist.
Id. at 1086-87.
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B. Sentencing Guidelines
Sentencing entrapment is often seen as a last ditch effort in situations, like that
of Alvin Terrill Foster,a8 where sentencing laws are mandatory and judges lack the
authority to use discretion in imposing the sentence. Because of the relationship be-
tween sentencing entrapment and mandatory sentencing, 9 it is necessary to examine the
development and status of sentencing laws, primarily the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines.
Before the institution of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, judges exercised
substantial discretion in imposing sentences.50 Such unfettered discretion, however,
led to disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants.5 In 1984, Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA)52 in response to the rising
concern about increased drug use and violent crime.53 The CCCA included the
Sentencing Reform Act, which replaced the United States Parole Commission with
the United States Sentencing Commission." The Sentencing Commission was
charged with drafting sentencing guidelines for the federal courts,55 thereby address-
ing the problem of disparate sentencing within the federal system. In developing
a structured sentencing model, the Commission heeded Congress's three goals for
the Guidelines: "enhancement of the criminal justice system's ability to reduce
crime, uniformity in sentencing, and proportionality in sentencing."56
The Guidelines were designed to work in a formulaic, mechanical fashion, thereby
removing excessive discretion from the judges' hands.57 The four-step process
begins with the judge determining the offender's base offense level by examining
the offender's "relevant conduct."5" Next, the base offense level may be adjusted
48 See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
'9 See Witten, supra note 9, at 706 ("Because the length of a drug offender's sentence
depends upon the quantity of drugs he or she bought or sold, some drug enforcement agents
attempt to persuade suspects to buy or sell drugs in amounts necessary to trigger higher
statutory penalties." (footnotes omitted)).
50 See Mitchell, supra note 19, at 749 ("Before Congress adopted the Guidelines in 1987,
judges wielded virtually unfettered discretion in sentencing.").
"' United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,272-303 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The
elimination of sentencing disparity, which Congress determined was chiefly the result of a
discretionary sentencing regime, was unquestionably Congress' principal aim." Id. at 292.
52 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
13 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1945 (1988).
14 See Witten, supra note 9, at 701.
55 Id.
56 LaBine, supra note 19, at 1527. See also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL §lAl.1(3) (2005) ("Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing the wide disparity in sentenc[ing] .... ") [hereinafter 2005 MANUAL].
17 See Witten, supra note 9, at 703-04.
18 Id. at 703.
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depending on case-specific factors, such as acceptance of responsibility.59 Third, the
judge determines the defendant's criminal history level,' and using the Sentencing
Guidelines' grid, the judge finds the point where the severity of the crime and the
defendant's criminal record level merge on the grid.6 ' After plotting this informa-
tion on the grid, the judge is left with a range of months for which he may sentence
the defendant.62
Recognizing that no sentencing scheme could be entirely comprehensive and
that departures from the grid and guidelines sometimes may be warranted, the Com-
mission provided that judges may depart from the guidelines only when "there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guide-
lines that should result in a sentence different from that described."63 To decide
whether a circumstance was not adequately considered by the Commission, "the court
shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commen-
tary of the Sentencing Commission."'
Some courts and commentators have criticized the Guidelines' quantity-based
sentencing scheme, arguing that "prosecutors and law enforcement officials are pre-
sented with an incentive to manipulate criminal investigations by increasing the
amount of drugs or money laundered to increase the defendant's sentence."65 Critics
contend that the discretion removed from the judges' sphere has been improperly
placed in the realm of law enforcement.' Thus, the argument goes, "the Commission
has inadvertently opened the door for governmental misuse and manipulation of sen-
tencing factors."67
With the recent United States v. Booker decision,68 some of those fears have been
alleviated as the risk of governmental abuse has been lessened with the dismantling of
59 Id.
6 id.
61 id.
62 Id. at 704.
63 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
64 id.
65 Witten, supra note 9, at 706.
6 Id. at 706-07; see also Federal Judge Condemns Sentencing Laws, CNN.com, Nov.
17, 2004 (on file with author).
67 Witten, supra note 9, at 706.
68 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The principal issue in the case concerned the role of fact-finding
by a sentencing judge, and the Court held that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction)
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 244. In deciding how to handle the impact on the
Sentencing Guidelines, a different majority - the "remedial majority" - emerged within
the Court. In an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court "severed and excised" the
mandatory provisions of the Guidelines, thereby transforming the Sentencing Guidelines into
a model which judges are expected, but no longer required, to follow. Id. at 245-47.
69 Critical of the rigidity of the Sentencing Guidelines, Daniel Abelson contends that
"[s]entencing entrapment is an unfortunate byproduct of the Guidelines" and that the proper
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the mandatory sentencing regime. Booker has been a controversial decision that has
provoked both cheers7" and jeers,71 as well as and a slew of unanswered questions.72
Nevertheless, until Congress acts to reinstate the mandatory nature of the Guidelines,73
the federal sentencing laws are not the rigid provisions that they had been since 1984.
Still it remains to be seen how far and how frequently judges will depart from the
Guidelines, particularly considering that the Department of Justice has taken a clear
position that it will continue to pursue sentences in accordance with the Guidelines.74
solution would be to "shift some discretion back to district judges." Abelson, supra note 25,
at 794. With the Booker decision, Abelson may have gotten his wish, as district courts have
regained sentencing discretion, at least to a degree. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-47.
71 Professor Michael O'Hear of Marquette University Law School had been critical of the
sentencing laws adopted by Congress, writing that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
more extreme than their state counterparts and that "Congress attempted to put federal judges
into a straitjacket." Michael O'Hear, Supreme Court Ruling on Sentencing Helps Judges,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 15, 2005, at 15A. Professor O'Hear praised the remedial
majority in Booker for allowing judges to have greater discretion to take into account various
"complex human variables that cannot be quantified." Id.
7' At a press conference shortly before leaving office, Attorney General John Ashcroft
warned listeners that "'[1] ast month's Supreme Court ruling that federal judges are not bound
by sentencing guidelines is a retreat from justice that may put the public's safety in jeopardy'
and may result in a "'return to revolving door justice."' Terry Frieden, Ashcroft Delivers
Parting Shot to Foes on Sentencing, Patriot Act, CNN.com, Feb. 1, 2005, available at http://
www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/01/ashcroft.parting/index.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2006). Ashcroft argued that application of the Guidelines has effectively reduced violent
crime in the nation, due in large part to the fact that "'[c]riminals can't commit crimes from
behind prison walls."' Id.
72 For example, it remains to be seen if the return to discretionary sentencing will also
cause a return to the sentencing discrepancies that precipitated the establishment of the man-
datory sentencing laws in the first place. As Professor Douglas Berman noted, "there's a big
gap between completely advisory and completely binding. And it's going to be for lower
courts to figure out how much authority they are given ... ." Interview by Gwen Ifill with
Douglas Berman, Professor, Ohio State University, and Mary Beth Buchanan, U.S. Attorney
for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Jan. 25, 2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/law/jan-june05/scotus_l-12.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
73 Justice Breyer noted that "[t]he ball now lies in Congress' court." Booker, 543 U.S. at
265. Similarly, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, contended that "Congress could reenact the
identical substantive provisions," provided that Congress included a clarifying provision
showing that the revised Guidelines required jury fact-finding in accordance with the "merits"
majority's holding. Id. at 283 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Memorandum from James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All
Federal Prosecutors 1-3 (Jan. 26,2006), available at http://sentencing.typepad.comsentencing-
law_andpolicy/files/dag.jan_28_comeymemo onbooker.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
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C. Mandatory Minimums
In the context of sentencing entrapment, it is also important to understand the
nature and role of mandatory minimum sentencing laws. Many defendants that
have raised sentencing entrapment claims have received heightened sentences based
on the quantity of controlled substances in which they were dealing.75
For nearly twenty years, drug sentencing in the federal system - as well as
many states - has looked to the quantity of a drug involved in a crime to determine
the appropriate sentence.76 In response to public concern over the rising number of
drug crimes, congressional leaders introduced mandatory minimums into the war
on drugs. 77 Accordingly, Congress authorized the Federal Sentencing Commission
to draft an elaborate sentencing regime that matched drug quantities with specific
sentencing ranges.7"
The application of mandatory minimums has not gone without criticism from
scholars and several courts, however. Mandatory minimums were challenged as cruel
and unusual, but the United States Supreme Court upheld their use in the face of
such Eighth Amendment challenges.79 Additionally, although the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines have been stripped of their role in mandatory sentencing," the Supreme
71 See, e.g., State v. Foster, 592 S.E.2d 259, 261 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); see also Gina
Cappello, Drug Case Yields Enhanced Sentence: Judge Rejects Defense of "Sentencing
Entrapment", LEGALINTELLIGENCER, Aug. 18, 1999, at 7 ("'I found the mandatory minimum
to apply, unfair as it may be,' [Judge Juan] Sanchez said.... Sanchez also said that sentenc-
ing entrapment did not apply in this case, although he admitted aspects of the investigation
were troubling.").
76 See William W. Wilkins, Jr. et. al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a "War on Drugs"
Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 305 (1993) (discussing the historical development of man-
datory minimums for drug violations).
77 Debate, Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable Weapon in the War
on Drugs ora Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (1999)
(statement of Cokie Roberts) ("[I]t was obviously responding to what was seen by voters, i.e.,
parents, as a very genuine concern and a real need to do something about what a lot of people
feared was a spreading drug epidemic and one that was harming their children.") [hereinafter
Debate].
78 See 2005 MANUAL, supra note 56, § 2Dl.l(c) (2005).
'9 InHarmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), the petitioner claimed that his sentence
was "cruel and unusual" because it was significantly disproportionate to the crime committed
and because the sentence was mandated, thereby precluding the judge from "taking into account
the particularized circumstances of the crime and of the criminal." Id. at 962. Writing for the
Court, Justice Scalia outlined the foundations for the Eighth Amendment, noting that, histori-
cally, the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" was employed to prevent judges from impos-
ing punishments that were not authorized by law, not to prohibit "disproportionate punish-
ments." Id. at 967-75. See generally Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475 (2005).
80 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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Court nevertheless has held that the decisions concerning sentencing guidelines do
not extend to mandatory minimums." Specifically, in Harris v. United States, the
Supreme Court noted that the decision in Apprendi 2 did not extend to mandatory
minimums.83 Accordingly, many commentators have concluded that the role of
mandatory minimums may have been greatly augmented.'
II. DEFINING AND APPLYING SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT 5
A. Treatment in the Federal Courts
1. Tackling the Claim Head On: United States v. Connell86
One of the leading cases in sentencing entrapment and one of the first cases to
thoroughly discuss the doctrine was decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Connell.8 7 In Connell, the defendant, an accountant, began laun-
dering money at the behest of an undercover Internal Revenue Service agent.88 Initially,
the undercover agent told the defendant that the money was coming from gambling
activities. 9 During subsequent meetings, however, the agent told the defendant that
8l Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568-69 (2002).
82 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior con-
viction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
83 Harris, 536 U.S. at 568-69.
The Court is well aware that many question the wisdom of mandatory
minimum sentencing. Mandatory minimums, it is often said, fail to
account for the unique circumstances of offenders who warrant a lesser
penalty. These criticisms may be sound, but they would persist whether
the judge or jury found the facts giving rise to the minimum. We hold
only that the Constitution permits the judge to do so, and we leave the
other questions to Congress, the States, and the democratic processes.
Id. (citations omitted).
4 Douglas Berman writes that many Washington insiders believe that "it is inevitable that
the striking down of the federal guidelines in Booker and Fanfan would lead to congressional
passage of additional mandatory minimums." Posting of Douglas Berman to Sentencing Law
and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.comlsentencing-law-and-policy/2004/09/fearand-
loathi.html (Sept. 12, 2004 10:23 EST).
85 A comprehensive overview of the doctrines of sentencing entrapment and sentencing
manipulation was recently published. See Abelson, supra note 25. An updated discussion of
the current status of sentencing entrapment is nevertheless warranted before critiquing its for-
mulation and application.
86 960 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1992).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 193.
89 Id. (noting that the defendant neither asked nor was told by the agent whether the gam-
bling activities were legal or illegal).
15932006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1583
the money was acquired from the illegal drug trade.90 After finding the defendant
guilty of illegal money laundering, the sentencing court found that "'the defendant
knew or believed that [laundered] funds were criminally derived property"' and,
accordingly, applied a statutorily-prescribed, five-level sentence enhancement. 9'
While not challenging the sting operation per se,92 the defendant argued that he
was entrapped into committing a greater offense than he otherwise would have com-
mitted.93 Specifically, he contended
that the vice lay in the timing: by broaching the subject of the
currency's supposed origin (drug trafficking) only after Connell
had fully completed three episodes of money laundering, the un-
dercover agent forced (or lured) him into actions he would other-
wise have eschewed, i.e., peripheral participation in the narcotics
trade. This Machiavellian scenario, Connell add[ed], was orches-
trated for the sole purpose of boosting the sentence he would ulti-
mately receive.94
The court recognized the possibility of manipulation in cases such as the defen-
dant's. Noting that "there is an element of manipulation in any sting operation,""
the real issue was whether there are times when the manipulation is of such a degree
that it must be "filtered out of the sentencing calculus." 96 The court ultimately rejec-
ted the application of such a defense to the facts of the defendant's case. 97 Never-
theless, the court stated, "We can foresee situations in which exploitative manipu-
lation of sentencing factors by government agents might overbear the will of a person
predisposed only to committing a lesser crime."98 The court refused, however, "to
chart the line between permissible and impermissible conduct on the part of govern-
ment agents insofar as that conduct may have an impact upon the district court's sen-
tencing options."99
9 Id.
9' Id. (quoting 2005 MANUAL, supra note 56, § 2S1.3(b)(1)) (alteration in original).
92 Id. at 194.
9' Id. at 192 ("This appeal, in which the appellant complains that the government practiced
'sentencing entrapment,' calls upon us to venture onto terra incognita.").
94 Id. at 194.
95 id.
96 Id.
9' Id. at 195-96 (noting that even if the defendant was unaware of the connection of the
money to illegal drug trafficking during the initial stages of the laundering scheme, he became
aware of the connection after being told by the undercover agent, and that at such a time, the
defendant had the opportunity and obligation to remove himself from the laundering scheme).
98 Id. at 196.
99 Id.
1594
MISNAMED, MISAPPLIED, AND MISGUIDED
The First Circuit clarified its position just three years later in United States v.
Montoya.1° ° Factually, Montoya is similar to State v. Foster,'' the North Carolina
case discussed earlier: the defendants were arrested as a result of a reverse sting
operation; they were convicted of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute;
and their sentences were predicated on the amount of cocaine they had purchased.'0 2
Rejecting the defendants' claim of sentencing manipulation, the court explained that
the focus of such a claim is on the government's conduct, which must be truly
egregious, and that "sentencing factor manipulation is a claim only for the extreme
and unusual case."'' 0 3 As the court explained, "[tihe standard is high because we are
talking about a reduction at sentencing, in the teeth of a statute or guideline approved
by Congress, for a defendant who did not raise or did not prevail upon an entrap-
ment defense at trial."'" The First Circuit has since indicated that it may be inclined
to accept a sentencing manipulation claim, but the standard remains high and the bur-
den remains on the defendant. 105 Accordingly, sentencing manipulation claims have
encountered little success in the First Circuit. l°"
10o 62 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995).
101 592 S.E.2d 259 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
102 Montoya, 62 F.3d at 2-3.
103 Id. at 4.
[D]efendant cannot make out a case of undue provocation simply by
showing that the idea originated with the government or that the conduct
was encouraged by it, or that the crime was prolonged beyond the first
criminal act, or exceeded in degree or kind what the defendant had done
before. What the defendant needs in order to require a reduction [in
sentence] are elements like these carried to such a degree that the govern-
ment's conduct must be viewed as "extraordinary misconduct."
Id. at 3-4 (second emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
'04 Id. at 4.
101 United States v. Maldonado-Montalvo, 356 F.3d 65, 72 (lst Cir. 2003). In this case, the
court reiterated that the intentions of the government agents, not the severity of their mis-
conduct, was the central focus of determining sentencing manipulation. See id. As the majority
stated, "[g]overnment manipulation designed solely to increase the severity of a criminal sen-
tence may afford a ground for departure, provided there is sufficient record evidence to demon-
strate that the government acted in 'bad faith."' Id.
106 See, e.g., United States v. Sdnchez-Berrfos, 424 F.3d 65, 78-79 (1 st Cir. 2005) (dismiss-
ing a sentencing factor manipulation claim for drug trafficking charges), cert. denied sub nom.,
Cruz-Pagan v. United States, No. 05-7904,2006 U.S. LEXIS 483 (Jan. 9,2006); United States
v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting a sentencing factor claim because the
government agents' conduct was permissible), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 212 (2005); United States
v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231,246 (1 st Cir. 2003) (denying a sentencing factor manipulation claim
because the defendant failed to demonstrate the government engaged in "extraordinary mis-
conduct"), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 142 (2004). It is worth noting, however, that the Court in
Barbour stated that sentencing manipulation could be shown where the government agents
"overpowered the free will of the defendant and caused him to commit a more serious offense
than he was predisposed to commit." Barbour, 393 F.3d at 86. It remains to be seen how signifi-
cant the predisposition aspect is to the First Circuit's analysis.
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2. Application of the Doctrine in the Other Circuits
The Second Circuit has yet to decide whether either sentencing entrapment or
sentencing manipulation is a viable defense to a sentence."0 7 Even if the Second
Circuit did accept such claims, however, it likely would require extreme or outrageous
government conduct as the court has taken a hard line on the issue of predisposition. 1 8
Employing the subjective version, the Third Circuit has defined sentencing en-
trapment as "'occurr[ing] when a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor
or lesser offense, is entrapped into committing a greater offense subject to greater
punishment.""' 9 Much like the other circuits that have recognized the doctrine, the
sentencing entrapment defense has encountered virtually no success."'
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the issue in United States v. Jones."' In Jones,
the court recognized the distinction between the subjective doctrine of sentencing
entrapment, which focuses on the defendant's predisposition, and the objective doctrine
of sentencing manipulation, which focuses on outrageous government conduct." 2
The court nevertheless refused to apply either doctrine to the facts of the case." 3
107 See United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2000).
108 See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 295 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that simply
because the defendant "was knowingly involved" in the drug deal, he could not have been
"induced to commit an offense that he was not otherwise predisposed to commit" (emphasis
added)); see also United States v. Gowdie, No. 99 Cr. 338-03 (RWS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6794, at *7 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2004) ("Based on the available facts, the investigation of the
conspiracy which led to Gowdie's arrest did not constitute conduct so improper as to be outra-
geous, such as would arguably support a downward departure based on sentencing manipulation.").
'09 United States v. Sumler, 294 F.3d 579, 582 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States
v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal citations and quotations
omitted)). But see Guzman-Marte v. United States, Nos. 04-CV-0628, 01-CR-0365, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18092, at *10-*11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24,2005) (applying a hybrid test, looking
for both extraordinary misconduct by the police and predisposition).
"o See, e.g., United States v. Coplin, 106 Fed. App'x 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2004); United States
v. Clark, 95 Fed. App'x 459, 460-61 (3d Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Kimley, 60 Fed.
App'x 369, 370 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review
the trial court's decision not to depart from the sentencing guidelines for sentence entrapment
where the trial court acknowledged its authority to so depart); United States v. Waddy, Crim.
No. 00-66.1, Civ. No. 02-6827,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18163, at *31 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18,2003)
("[A]lthough Judge Waldman noted that the Third Circuit has never recognized a departure for
sentencing entrapment, he nevertheless believed that he had the power to depart downward on
the basis of sentencing entrapment but exercised his discretion not to do so.").
".. 18 F.3d 1145 (4th Cir. 1994).
112 Id. at 1152-54.
"3 Id. at 1154 ("We have never spoken to the legal viability of 'sentencing entrapment'
theory, and need not do so here."); id. ("[W]e conclude that, here, we need not decide whether
the theory of sentencing manipulation has any basis in law for, on the facts presented, it would,
in any event, be inapplicable.").
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Resistance to applying the doctrines has continued, and defendants have raised the
issue with little success in the various courts in the Fourth Circuit. 14
The Fifth" 5 and Sixth Circuits" 6 have neither applied nor adopted the concepts
of sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation. In fact, the Fifth Circuit
noted that the doctrines were but a "'trendy' argument""' 7 and that there was only
one instance where an appellate court reversed a sentence on the basis of either
sentencing entrapment or sentencing manipulation."' Also of particular note is a
recent district court decision from the Sixth Circuit, where the court maintained that
sentencing entrapment, based on the defendant's predisposition, is still not a valid
basis for a downward departure in sentencing, even after the Supreme Court ren-
dered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in Booker."9
114 See United States v. Brown, 69 Fed. App'x 175, 177 (4th Cir. 2003).
Brown's sentencing entrapment claim fails because he did not claim that
he lacked a predisposition to committing the drug offense. Further, his
sentencing manipulation claim also fails because it is not outrageous for
the government to continue to purchase narcotics from willing sellers even
after a level of narcotics relevant for sentencing purposes has been sold.
Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir 1994) (internal citation omit-
ted). See also Knight v. United States, Nos. 3:03CR163, 3:04CV772, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8622, at *11-* 14 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2005); United States v. Atwater, 336 F. Supp. 2d 626, 629
(E.D. Va. 2004) (noting that "this Circuit cast grave doubt over [the doctrine of sentencing ma-
nipulation] in United States v. Jones."). The court in Atwater also reiterated that "[s]entencing
entrapment requires that a defendant be devoid of criminal disposition." Id. at 630 n.2 (empha-
sis added).
"' See United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271 (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Snow, 309 F.3d 294, 295 (5th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that the court has not determined "whether
sentencing entrapment is a cognizable defense to a sentence"). The court in Snow at least seemed
to acknowledge the potential for either definition: "Snow has failed to show that the government
agent persuaded Snow to commit a greater criminal offense than he was predisposed to commit
or that the agent's conduct was outrageous, resulting in sentencing factor manipulation." Id.
116 See United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1996) ("While other circuits
have recognized sentencing entrapment, this circuit has never acknowledged sentencing entrap-
ment as a valid basis for a downward departure.... ."); see also United States v. May, 399
F.3d 817, 827-28 (6th Cir. 2005); Sosa v. Jones, 389 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting
that while "Mr. Sosa's case appears unfortunate," there simply existed no precedent warranting
adoption of sentencing entrapment).
"1 Washington, 44 F.3d at 1279.
11 Id. at 1280 & n.28 (citing United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107-08 (9th Cir.
1994)).
"1 United States v. Dottery, 353 F. Supp. 2d 894, 897 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
This concept takes on less significance, perhaps, under a regime in which
the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory. None-
theless, it does not appear that an argument is available to the defendant
that the Court should calculate the drug quantity and type within the drug
quantity table in [the Guidelines] by discounting those amounts for which
the defendant claims he was entrapped.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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The Seventh Circuit has explicitly rejected sentencing manipulation. 2 ' While
the court voiced its skepticism about the concept in 1995, it clarified its position the
following year: "We now hold that there is no defense of sentencing manipulation
in this circuit." ' Similarly, sentencing entrapment has found no appeal in this circuit. 22
In United States v. Barth, 23 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[s]en-
tencing entrapment has been described by this court as 'outrageous official conduct
[which] overcomes the will of an individual predisposed only to dealing in small
quantities for the purposes of increasing the amount of drugs... and the resulting
sentence of the entrapped defendant. ,,124 While conduct of the government officials
is examined in this jurisdiction, such misconduct need not be "extraordinary" or
"extreme and unusual."'12' Although it recognized and defined the doctrine, the court
noted that it had never actually applied sentencing entrapment in any case and, yet
again, the Court refused to apply it in Barth. 26 The court has continued its reluctance
to reverse a defendant's sentence on grounds of entrapment or manipulation.
27
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Eighth Circuit's definition in adopting sentencing
entrapment. 2 s In adopting the doctrine, the court was particularly concerned about
prosecutorial discretion:
120 United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Mitchell,
353 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2003) (refusing to accept a sentencing entrapment claim for a sexual
offense where the sentence was enhanced based on what the defendant believed to be the age
of the undercover agent).
121 Garcia, 79 F.3d at 76.
122 See United States v. Stephen, No. 05-2100, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28393, at *7 (7th
Cir. Dec. 20, 2005) (explaining that sentencing entrapment is a "doctrine we do not favor").
123 990 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1993).
124 Id. at 424 (citing United States v. Rogers, 982 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1993)) (second
and third alterations in original).
25 Cf. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1992).
126 Barth, 990 F.2d at 425 ("While we are concerned with the government conduct in this
case, Barth has failed to demonstrate that the government's conduct was outrageous or that
the undercover officer's conduct overcame his predisposition to sell small quantities of crack
cocaine.").
127 See, e.g., United States v. Parks, 87 Fed. App'x 2,4 (8th Cir. 2004). Parks also demon-
strates the high degree of deference the Court of Appeals will grant to trial courts in evaluating
such claims. See id. The court noted: 'The district court was aware of its ability to depart on
these grounds but chose not to do so based on its findings that the Government did not act
improperly, try to manipulate Parks's sentence, or commit sentencing entrapment.... We thus
affirm Parks's conviction and sentence." Id. (internal citation omitted).
12 United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Barth, 990 F.2d
at 424). The Ninth Circuit later clarified the doctrine as applied to sellers of narcotics: "In
making a sentencing entrapment claim, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate both
the lack of intent to produce and the lack of the capability to produce the quantity of drugs
at issue." United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 n.13 (9th Cir. 1995). Interestingly,
several of the states in the Ninth Circuit seem to employ the objective version of traditional
entrapment. See supra note 39.
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Drug agents can decide, apparently without any supervision by
anybody to negotiate with somebody for an ounce, a pound, a
kilo, 100 kilos, a million kilos of a substance and, of course, if
the defendant bites at the bait, then that amount chosen by the
drug agent will determine his drug sentence.'29
Unlike the courts previously described, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not
evaluate the doctrine only to brush it aside on the facts of the case before it. Rather,
the court reversed and remanded the Staufer case for re-sentencing on the grounds
that the defendant had been entrapped into committing a more serious offense than
he otherwise would have committed. 3° This court has remanded other cases for
possible resentencing,'3 ' but has made equally clear that the burden remains firmly
on the defendant,'32 and if the defendant does not raise the issue of sentencing
entrapment at the district court level, the claim is deemed waived on appeal.'33
In United States v. Lacey,"3 the defendant argued to the Tenth Circuit that the
"government's decision to continue the investigation and to negotiate a multi-kilogram
purchase of cocaine was for the sole purpose of increasing his punishment under the
sentencing guidelines."'35 The court rejected the defendant's argument and the doc-
trine of sentencing entrapment:
129 Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1107-08.
'0 Id. at 1108.
13' United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1997).
[I]t was error for the district court to deny the motion to reveal the iden-
tity of the informant without holding an in camera hearing to determine
whether the informant's testimony would be relevant and helpful to the
defendants on the question of sentencing entrapment.
... If the district court concludes that the testimony is relevant and
potentially helpful as to the sentencing entrapment claim, then the dis-
trict court must conduct a hearing to resolve that claim, and then, accor-
ding to the outcome, either reinstate the sentences.., or resentence the
defendants ....
Id. However, the court has rigidly applied the doctrine at times. For example, in rejecting one
sentencing entrapment claim, the Court noted that the defendant stated he was not predis-
posed to commit any drug offense whereas the sentencing entrapment doctrine applies only to
those predisposed to commit a minor offense but entrapped into committing a more serious of-
fense. United States v. Villa-Serrano, 83 Fed. App'x 937, 938 (9th Cir. 2003).
132 Naranjo, 52 F.3d at 250 n. 13. Satisfying such a burden, however, requires evidence be-
yond the defendant's bare assertion of lack of intent or ability to sell the drugs. See United
States v. Nieto-Cruz, 97 Fed. App'x 703,704 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 892 (2004).
3 United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if the defendant does
raise the issue, the court may still refuse to review the district court's decision to deny a
defendant's request for a downward departure based on sentencing entrapment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chang, 7 Fed. App'x 650, 651 (9th Cir. 2001).
'1 86 F.3d 956, 962-63 (10th Cir 1996).
'31 Id. at 262-63.
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[W]e believe that the analogy to entrapment at the sentencing phase
is misplaced, for once a defendant crosses "the reasonably bright
line between guilt and innocence .... a defendant's criminal incli-
nation has already been established, and the extent of the crime is
more likely to be a matter of opportunity than of scruple.' 36
The Tenth Circuit has, however, entertained claims of sentencing manipulation,
which it examines under the rubric of outrageous government conduct - "whether,
considering the totality of the circumstances in any given case, the government's con-
duct is so shocking, outrageous and intolerable that it offends 'the universal sense of
justice. ,,137 Nonetheless, as a result of this high standard, such claims routinely fail. 138
The Eleventh Circuit has taken a very clear position on sentencing entrapment
- predisposition of the defendant is not a basis for a downward departure in
sentencing.139 In rejecting sentencing entrapment, the Eleventh Circuit focused
more on the policies behind reverse stings:
Government infiltration of criminal activity is a recognized and
permissible means of investigation, and frequently requires that
the government agent furnish something of value to the crimi-
nal. The fact that government agents may supply or sell illegal
drugs or provide other essential services does not necessarily
constitute misconduct. Moreover, challenges to the "reverse sting"
method of police investigation have been rejected by this Court
on numerous occasions."
The court has, however, accepted the theoretical possibility of a sentencing manipu-
lation claim, but has indicated that the government conduct will need to be truly
extraordinary, whereby notions of fairness would preclude enforcing the defendant's
136 Id. at 963 n.5 (quoting United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995)) (omission
in original).
131 Id. at 964 (quoting United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1992)).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Westover, 107 Fed. App'x 840,847 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Regard-
less of why the delay [in indicting the defendant] occurred, the government's conduct in this
case did not contravene the applicable due process standard."); see also United States v. Rice,
100 Fed. App'x 739, 743 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hightower, 94 Fed. App'x 750,
755-56 (10th Cir. 2004).
139 United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (1 th Cir. 1998) ("[D]efendants' claim
must fail as a matter of law because this Circuit has rejected sentence entrapment as a viable
defense.").
"4 Id. at 1413 (internal citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit recently indicated that the
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi may affect the doctrine of sentencing entrapment, but
the court nevertheless refused to decide the viability of the doctrine under the facts present.
United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11 th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 937 (2004).
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sentence.' 4' Similarly, this court, much like the Tenth Circuit, noted that there may
be situations where the government conduct is so outrageous as to violate due
process and constitute a complete defense to the conviction itself.'42
The D.C. Circuit has also refused to accept sentencing entrapment. In United States
v. Walls,'43 undercover officers offered to buy crack cocaine from the defendants.'"
The defendants produced only powder cocaine, but at the insistence of the officers,
the defendants supplied crack cocaine, resulting in a heightened sentence.'45 Accord-
ing to the court:
Walls and Jackson ask us to concentrate on the agent's testimony
that he insisted on crack rather than powder because the penalties
are higher.... The main element in any entrapment defense is
rather the defendant's "predisposition" - "whether the defendant
was an 'unwary innocent' or instead an 'unwary criminal' who
readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime."
Persons ready, willing and able to deal in drugs - persons like
Walls and Jackson - could hardly be described as innocents.
These defendants showed no hesitation in committing the crimes
for which they were convicted. Alone, this is enough to destroy
their entrapment argument.'46
... Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1414 ('The fact that the government's fictitious reverse sting
operation involved a large quantity of drugs does not amount to the type of manipulative
governmental conduct warranting a downward departure in sentencing."); see also United
States v. Govan, 293 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11 th Cir. 2002). In Govan, the court stated:
In the present case, the district court concluded there was sentence
manipulation because the government aggregated separate quantities of
crack cocaine by buying small quantities on four separate occasions,
instead of stopping and arresting Govan after the first buy. But these
circumstances are indistinguishable in principle from those in Sanchez.
Making four purchases instead of just one in this case is no more
manipulative than the government in Sanchez setting in motion a fic-
titious sting operation involving a large quantity of drugs instead of a
small one.
Id.
142 Sanchez, 138 F.3dat 1413. Citing the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit stated in dicta:
"[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct
of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction, ... the instant case is distinctly not of that
breed."
Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)) (alteration in original).
143 70 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
4 Id. at 1328.
145 Id.
'46 Id. at 1329 (quoting Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58,63 (1988)) (citations omitted).
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While the D.C. Circuit has rejected the sentencing entrapment defense, it has seem-
ingly left open the possibility for recognition of sentencing manipulation based on
a due process violation. 47 Nevertheless, the D.C. courts have made clear that due pro-
cess requires truly outrageous conduct for a defendant to have his sentence decreased.1
41
3. Summarizing the Federal Approach to Sentencing Entrapment
From sentencing entrapment to sentencing manipulation and from individual
predisposition to outrageous governmental conduct, the courts have employed
myriad terms, maxims, and definitions in an attempt to frame this controversial
doctrine. Four circuits 49 seem to have adopted, and one circuit' 5° has rejected, the
objective definition of the doctrine focusing on outrageous government conduct.
Three circuits appear to have adopted the subjective version focusing on predisposi-
tion, and one circuit' 5 ' has even applied the doctrine in remanding a case for resen-
tencing; on the other hand, four circuits 52 have rejected such an approach. Two
courts "'53 seem to have entertained the possibility of a combination of the subjective
147 Id.
If the propriety of the agents' conduct had any significance, it would
only be with respect to the following dictum in Russell: "we may some
day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law en-
forcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from involving judicial processes to
obtain a conviction."
Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)).
"4 See United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reiterating the require-
ment of proof of "'coercion, violence, or brutality to the person"'). The District Court for the
District of Columbia has expressed concern and disdain in regards to the police practice of
insisting that powder cocaine be cooked into crack, an offense resulting in a much higher
sentence. United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 111 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that
"[tihe defendant.., was asked to cook the cocaine for the sole purpose of increasing her
resulting sentence" and that "[tihis purpose and practice must be viewed as outrageous.").
However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has not been so moved. United States v. Shepherd,
102 F.3d 558, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reversing the district court and holding that "a request by
a government agent for crack cocaine upon a seller's delivery of powder cocaine, without more,
does not establish a claim of 'sentencing entrapment."').
'4 The First, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits appear to have recognized the possibility
of sentencing manipulation or an objective version of sentencing entrapment. See supra Part
II.A.2.
' 0 The Seventh Circuit expressly rejected sentencing manipulation. See supra Part H.A.
' The Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals to have actually applied either doctrine.
See supra Part II.A.
152 The Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have rejected the subjective approach.
See supra Part II.A.
15' The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have yet to conclusively decide the issue. See supra Part
II.A.
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and objective versions, but even those circuits remain undecided. Without question,
there is no unanimity in the federal system on how, when, or even if to permit the
imposition of a mitigated sentence based on a claim of entrapment.'54
B. Treatment in the State Courts
As demonstrated above, a rift divides the federal courts, but at the state level,
a majority of the courts have rejected or refused to apply the doctrine of sentencing
entrapment. Only four 55 state courts have approved of either sentencing entrap-
ment or sentencing manipulation claims. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
adopted sentencing entrapment in Leech v. State.5 6 The version adopted by the court
was similar to the subjective approach to sentencing entrapment recognized in the
Eighth Circuit:' 57
If the defendant had no previous intent to commit the greater
crime or did not become ready and willing to commit a greater
crime during the course of the transaction, even though predis-
posed to commit the lesser crime, then a finding that law
enforcement agents committed sentencing entrapment would
require that the defendant be found not guilty of the greater
crime, and guilty of the lesser offense."'
As is further evident, however, the Oklahoma court viewed sentencing entrapment
as a substantive defense to the crime charged. 9 Conversely, in the federal courts
that have embraced the subjective doctrine of sentencing entrapment, the defendant
would still be found guilty of the offense charged, but his sentence would be reduced
" As recently noted by Professor Alschuler: "The manipulation of sentencing exposure by
law enforcement officers appears to be a significant source of disparity." Albert W. Aschuler,
Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV.
85, 112 (2005).
... This does not include the North Carolina Court of Appeals, as that court's adoption of
sentencing entrapment stands without precedential value. See supra notes 17, 21-22 and accom-
panying text.
156 66 P.3d 987 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003).
117 Id. at 992 (Chapel, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority used the standard outlined
by the Eighth Circuit).
158 Id. at 990 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
159 See id.
A defendant who intended to possess small amounts of an illegal drug
could be entrapped by officers into possessing a trafficking quantity or
even a quantity sufficient to support a charge of intent to distribute. In
that event, the defendant would be entitled to an instruction on sentenc-
ing entrapment to allow the jury to determine whether the defendant
was guilty of the greater or lesser charge.
Id. (emphasis added).
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to reflect reduced culpability.6° Additionally, the Oklahoma court failed to indicate
whether outrageous government conduct was an element of sentencing entrapment
as well as what burden the defendant would have to carry to receive such an instruc-
tion. Finally, despite adopting the doctrine, albeit an odd version of sentencing
entrapment, the court refused to apply it to the facts of the case. 6'
The Supreme Court of Michigan has stated that while "police misconduct...
is not an appropriate factor to consider at sentencing," there may exist rare cases in
which a downward departure from the guidelines may be warranted based on senten-
cing entrapment. 62 While the court did not rely on the precise phrase "sentencing
entrapment," it stated that "if the defendant has an enhanced intent that was the pro-
duct of police conduct.. . and the enhanced intent can be shown in a manner that
satisfies the requirements for a sentencing departure ... it is permissible for a court
to consider that enhanced intent in making a departure."
1 63
Adopting the outrageous government conduct version of sentencing entrapment,
often termed "sentencing manipulation," one of the Pennsylvania lower courts held
that "sentence reduction is an appropriate and just response to outrageous govern-
ment conduct designed solely to increase a defendant's term of incarceration."16
Despite acknowledging the doctrine, the court refused to apply it to the defendant
in that case. 65 Furthermore, the court placed a heavy burden on defendants in future
cases claiming sentencing entrapment:
Simply put, sentencing entrapment/manipulation is difficult to
prove; it is not established "simply by showing that the idea
originated with the government or that the conduct was encour-
aged by it, .. . or that the crime was prolonged beyond the first
criminal act.., or exceeded in degree or kind what the defen-
dant had done before."' 166
'6o See, e.g., United States v. Staufer 38 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1994).
161 Leech, 66 P.3d at 990 ("Leech never claimed entrapment, whether in a traditional sense
or in the nature of sentencing entrapment. There is no evidence of entrapment in the record.").
The court still reduced the defendant's sentence, but based such a reduction instead on the
defendant's age and lack of access to good time credits. See id.
162 People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 283-84 (Mich. 2004).
163 Id. at 284. In Michigan, the requirements for downward departure involve an "objective
and verifiable" reason that "keenly or irresistibly grab[s] our attention"; is "of considerable
worth in deciding the length of a sentence"; and "exist[s] only in exceptional cases." People v.
Babcock, 666 N.W.2d 231,237 (Mich. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
'6' Commonwealth v. Petzold, 701 A.2d 1363, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) ("[W]e adopt
the standard typically applied in such cases, namely, the existence of 'outrageous government
conduct' . . . which is designed to and results in an increased sentence for the convicted
defendant.").
165 Id. at 1367.
"6 Id. at 1366-67 (quoting United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1995)) (omis-
sions in original).
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The reasoning used by that court and the viability of sentencing entrapment in
Pennsylvania will soon be addressed head on by the state's highest court. 167 Barring
a different approach taken by the state supreme court, Pennsylvania is joined by
Florida, which has taken a similar approach to sentencing manipulation - bad faith
on the part of the government.
168
Essentially, Oklahoma and Michigan seem to adopt sentencing entrapment, and
Pennsylvania and Florida appear to recognize sentencing manipulation as grounds
for downward departure. Other state courts, however, have been more reluctant to
acknowledge sentencing entrapment. The Hawaii Court of Appeals discussed the
theoretical possibility of sentencing entrapment, but declined to adopt it.' 69 The
court also recognized that it is "germane to this question that the police do not solicit
criminal activity from the general public or any other persons, other than those who
actively seek out such activity. 170
Among the states that have either declined to adopt or have expressly rejected
the concept outright is Arizona, where a court noted that "[o]ur decision not to
apply the doctrines of sentence entrapment or manipulation has substantial support
from otherjurisdictions.' 7' The court recognized that, in addition to several federal
circuits, "other state courts have found, as we have, that allowing a trial court to
depart from the mandatory minimum sentence is either in conflict with or unneces-
sary under their state's statutory scheme." 172 Minnesota has expressed the same
skepticism as to the validity of a sentencing departure on such grounds.
7 1
Along with Arizona, the Supreme Court of California has rejected the defense.
In People v. Smith,174 the California high court affirmed the lower court's decision
167 See Commonwealth v. Cole, No. 675 MAL 2005, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3087 (Pa. Dec. 28,
2005) (granting an appeal to determine whether police engaged in sentencing entrapment by
continuing to make controlled buys even after they had sufficient evidence to convict the de-
fendant for the purpose of enhancing his sentence).
168 State v. Steadman, 827 So. 2d 1022, 1024-26 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting the defen-
dant's claim of sentencing manipulation, but holding that sentencing manipulation occurs when
there are no "legitimate law enforcement reasons... to support the police conduct"), disc. rev.
denied, 842 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 2003).
169 State v. Yip, 987 P.2d 996 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999). The court noted that if it were to accept
sentencing as a viable concept, it would fall under the rubric of outrageous government conduct
and would constitute an affirmative defense. See id. at 1010.
170 Id. at 1010. The court also acknowledged that it had upheld police tactics designed to
produce first degree felony cases. See id. (citing State v. Timas, 923 P.2d 916, 931-33 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1996)).
171 State v. Monaco, 83 P.3d 553,557 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), rev. denied, No. CR-04-0154-
PR, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 115 (Ariz. Oct. 26, 2004).
172 id.
173 See, e.g., State v. Smith, No. A03-1859, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 1052, at *9-11 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 14,2004), rev. denied, No. A03-1859, 2004 Minn. LEXIS 826 (Minn. Dec. 14,
2004).
174 80 P.3d 662, (Cal. 2003).
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to reject the doctrine of sentencing entrapment.'75 Turning to sentencing manipula-
tion, the court refused to reach a decision on whether to adopt it, but noted that if
the doctrine was to be adopted, it would entail a rigid standard: "Were the doctrine
of sentencing manipulation to be adopted in California, the predicate conduct
should be truly outrageous. By contrast, as the United States First Circuit Court of
Appeals observed, 'garden variety manipulation claims are largely a waste of time."" 76
Other state jurisdictions that have refused to adopt the doctrines of sentenc-
ing entrapment and/or sentencing manipulation include Indiana,' Louisiana,178
Massachusetts, 179 Ohio, 8 0 Tennessee,'' Texas,' 2 and Wisconsin."s3 Thus, in the states
that have addressed the doctrines of sentencing entrapment or sentencing manipu-
lation, only four have accepted such claims as compared to the ten that have either
rejected the doctrines or refused to reach the issue, and of those four, only two have
accepted the subjective doctrine of sentencing entrapment.
III. REJECTING SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT
The Fifth Circuit was absolutely correct in calling sentencing entrapment a
"trendy argument,""' and this is one trend that needs to be abandoned. As will be
shown, the subjective approach embodied in sentencing entrapment presents serious
"I Id. at 667.
176 Id. at 665 (quoting United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995)).
'" See Salama v. State, 690 N.E.2d 762,765 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) ("Indiana has yet to recog-
nize the doctrine of sentencing entrapment.").
178 See State v. Hardy, 715 So. 2d 466,472 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("No Court in this state has
adopted 'sentencing entrapment' as a defense, and we decline now to adopt such a defense.").
179 See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 724 N.E.2d 683, 691 (Mass. 2000) (noting that the doc-
trine had been rejected by Commonwealth v. Garcia, 659 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1996)).
180 See State v. Reno, No. 04CA2759, 2005 WL 674455, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 14,
2005) ("In the case at bar, because Ohio does not recognize a sentencing entrapment defense,
appellant's requested instruction is not a correct statement of Ohio law. Therefore, the trial court
possessed no obligation to give appellant's requested sentencing entrapment instruction.").
1' See State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322,332 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) ("[Sluch a defense
is not recognized in Tennessee...."), rev. denied, No. M2000-03149-SC-R 11-CD, 2003 Tenn.
LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Sept. 15, 2003).
12 See Watrous v. State, No. 14-96-00853-CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 1238, at *11-12 (Tx.
Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1999) ("No Texas court, however, has recognized the concept of 'sentencing
entrapment."').
113 See State v. Farr, No. 95-1158-CR, at *8-9 (Apr. 10, 1996). In rejecting sentencing
manipulation, the court highlighted the fact that trial judges in Wisconsin have discretion in
sentencing, unlike judges in the federal courts, and thus can consider outrageous government
conduct. See id. As a result of the recent Booker decision, federal judges are no longer bound
by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244-65,
(2005) (explaining that federal judges must at least consider the Guidelines, but the Guidelines
are no longer mandatory). Accordingly, the reasoning employed by the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals reinforces the criticism of further judicial adoption and application of sentencing
entrapment.
's" See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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practical and legal problems that some courts have either overlooked or underesti-
mated. It is because of these problems that the subjective version should be rejected
and, with circuit courts unable to come to an agreement, 8 5 that responsibility may
fall to the Supreme Court.
186
A. Difficulties in Establishing Predisposition
First, the focus of the substantive defense of entrapment, the foundation of
sentencing entrapment, is on the predisposition of the individual defendant, not the
conduct of the government. The Supreme Court first discussed this distinction in
United States v. Russell, 87 and in Jacobson v. United States,188 the Court reaffirmed
this position. The Court explained that entrapment occurs "when the criminal design
originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense."'
8 9
While the Supreme Court has adhered to such a definition,"9 it frequently con-
tinues to be a source of confusion for courts evaluating entrapment claims.' 9 ' In the
context of sentencing entrapment, the issue of predisposition becomes even cloudier,
and line drawing based on predisposition can pose unreasonable challenges to the
courts. The Supreme Court in Russell was careful to note that the judicial doctrine
of entrapment was designed to distinguish between "an unwary innocent" and "an
unwary criminal."' 92 However, the focus on innocence, as seen through the clause
"innocent person," is misplaced when it comes to sentencing entrapment because
the defendant is clearly not "innocent." As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals cor-
rectly noted, "[p]ersons ready, willing and able to deal in drugs... could hardly be
described as innocents."'
193
Furthermore, even if the notion of "innocence" could be set aside,'94 proving
predisposition to commit lesser crimes, as opposed to the mere predisposition to
commit any criminal acts, could become an evidentiary nightmare. Courts would
be left to decide issues such as whether a defendant only meant to purchase five
185 See supra Part II.A.
'86 See infra Part VI.
187 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
188 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
189 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
'9' Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442).
191 See generally John David Buretta, Note, Reconfiguring the Entrapment and Outrageous
Government Conduct Doctrines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1955 (1996) (discussing the ambiguity
surrounding the subjective version of entrapment adopted by the Court).
192 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
'9' United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See also supra note 146
and accompanying text.
'94 Ignoring "innocence" in sentencing entrapment would then make the doctrine funda-
mentally inconsistent with traditional entrapment, thereby leaving sentencing entrapment with
no theoretical foundation. See infra Part III.B.
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grams of cocaine for his own use as opposed to a trafficking amount of cocaine that
he actually purchased.'95 Courts would be forced to inquire into the quantities and
types of drugs and the frequency in which defendants dealt in the past. Addition-
ally, such a doctrine may increase the incentives for perjury, as a defendant could
testify or have others testify that he had previously been a small-time dealer; in the
absence of a prior criminal record or evidence relating to the defendant from prior
investigations, the prosecution would have a difficult time rebutting such claims.
It is one thing for a court to decide and for a prosecutor to argue (or concede) that
a defendant did or did not have a predisposition to commit the crime at all; it is
quite another issue when a defendant claims he was not predisposed to commit a
crime that severe.
B. Inconsistent with Traditional Entrapment
To reiterate, entrapment occurs when "the criminal design originates with the
officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit the alleged offense."'96 Not only is proving disposition prob-
lematic, but sentencing entrapment is arguably inconsistent with the traditional entrap-
ment defense, the very doctrine upon which sentencing entrapment is grounded.
As the Supreme Court held in Sorrells:
The predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are
relevant. But the issues raised and the evidence adduced must
be pertinent to the controlling question whether the defendant
is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking
to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the
creative activity of its own officials.' 97
Predisposition was relevant, but innocence was controlling. With sentencing
entrapment, however, all of the defendants are unwary criminals. Innocence is
never present, much less controlling, in cases involving sentencing entrapment, as
such defendants have already been found guilty of the substantive offense and only
seek to reduce the resulting sentence. Protection of innocence has been the under-
lying theme in the Supreme Court's entrapment jurisprudence, 9 ' and accordingly,
' See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
'9' Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
'9' Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
19' References to innocence pervade the relevant Court decisions. See, e.g., id. at 442 ("A
different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the
Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit
the alleged offense." (emphasis added)); see also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
372 (1958) ("Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting
innocent persons into violations." (emphasis added)).
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the benefits of the doctrine of entrapment were not intended to be extended to defen-
dants who only intended to commit less severe crimes.
Indeed, if sentencing entrapment can be at all reconciled with the traditional
defense of entrapment, that consistency is with the objective version of sentencing
entrapment, often termed "sentencing manipulation." Specifically, analyzing whether
the government "implant[ed]"' 99 criminal intentions in the mind of the defendant "is
consistent with the objective test of entrapment, since it focuses upon the govern-
ment's actions in developing the crime."2"0
While ostensibly grounded on the substantive defense, the doctrine of sentencing
entrapment is fundamentally inconsistent with traditional entrapment. In states
where an objective approach to entrapment has been adopted, the subjective concept
of sentencing entrapment cannot stand,01 and insofar as entrapment has been out-
lined by the Supreme Court, the doctrine is more consistent with sentencing manip-
ulation than sentencing entrapment.
C. Statutory Interpretation and Separation of Powers
While the Sentencing Commission thoroughly reviewed their creation, they
nevertheless recognized the potential for gaps and the need for departure from the
guidelines in rare cases. Thus, the sentencing guidelines, even in their pre-Booker
mandatory state, allowed judges to depart from the guidelines where "the court finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulat-
ing the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described."2 2
The Sentencing Commission explicitly delineated what sources a sentencing judge
should examine in determining what was "taken into consideration."2 3 Specifi-
cally, "the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements,
and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission."' '2°
The Sentencing Commission clarified that departure from the guidelines based
on factors not enumerated in the guidelines should be "highly infrequent."2 5 Several
courts that have analyzed sentencing entrapment claims have attempted to circum-
vent this explicit warning by construing the official commentary beyond its plain
199 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
200 David J. Elbaz, Note, The Troubling Entrapment Defense: How About an Economic
Approach?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 117, 130 (1999).
20o See, e.g., People v. Smith, 80 P.3d 662, 667 (Cal. 2003).
202 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(b) (2001).
203 Id.
204 Id. "The official commentary, often referred to as application notes, provides examples
of specific fact patterns and direction to judges for the appropriate use of the Guidelines."
LaBine, supra note 19, at 1528.
205 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GuIDELINEs MANUAL § 1A4(b) (1997) [hereinafter 1997
MANUAL].
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language and import. In United States v. Staufer, the Ninth Circuit relied on Applica-
tion Note Fifteen to section 2D 1.1 of the Guidelines:
If, in a reverse sting [operation]. ... the court finds that the
government agent set a price for the controlled substance that
was substantially below the market value of the controlled
substance, thereby leading to the defendant's purchase of a
significantly greater quantity of the controlled substance than
his available resources would have allowed him to purchase
except for the artificially low price set by the government agent,
a downward departure may be warranted. °6
The facts in Staufer, however, did not fit within the exception provided in Applica-
tion Note Fifteen. In Staufer, the defendant was the seller, not the buyer, and the gov-
ernment agents conducted a traditional sting, not a reverse sting.2 7 By applying
Application Note Fifteen to the facts in the Staufer case, the Ninth Circuit overstepped
its authority and interpreted the Sentencing Guidelines in clear violation of plain lan-
guage and legislative intent.
The following year, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Application Note Twelve as
further authority for departure based on sentencing entrapment.2 °8 In cases involv-
ing sales of controlled substances, that note provides that
[w]here the court finds that the defendant did not intend to
produce and was not reasonably capable of producing the
negotiated amount, the court shall exclude from the guideline
calculation the amount that it finds the defendant did not intend
to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing.2"
When taken together, these two Sentencing Commission Application Notes served
as the foundation for the court's application of sentencing entrapment.
2 '10
206 United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 1997 MANAL, supra
note 205, §2D1.1 cmt. 15) (second alteration and omission in original). The application note
was originally number seventeen. In 2001, this application note was amended again, whereby
the text was unchanged but the note number was changed to fourteen. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, GUIDELINE MANUAL §2D1.1 cmt. 14 (2001).
207 Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1105.
208 United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1995). Much as in Staufer, how-
ever, the facts did not fit the Court's reasoning. Application Note Twelve applies to situations
where the defendant is the seller, but in Naranjo, the defendant was the purchaser. Id. at 246.
209 Id. at 250 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GuiDELINEs MANUAL §2D 1.1 cmt. 12
(1993)).
210 See LaBine, supra note 19, at 1532.
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The Ninth Circuit erred in its formulation of sentencing entrapment. The
Sentencing Commission clearly stated that departures not enumerated in the com-
mentary or guidelines themselves must be founded on principles and situations not
considered by the Commission. 21' The Commission was clearly aware of the police
practices of stings and reverse stings, but nevertheless limited the possibility for
downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines to particular instances of
those practices. 2 2 Application Note Fifteen was designed to apply to situations only
where the government set the price for the drugs artificially and substantially below
the market price.213 Application Note Twelve only reaches scenarios where a defen-
dant seller of drugs either did not intend to, or was not reasonably capable of, supply-
ing the quantity of drugs agreed to by the defendant and the undercover agents.214
This situation blatantly omits situations where the defendant seller in fact supplied
the agreed-upon amount. Additionally, Application Note Twelve does not allow
any departure based on the type of the substance. 2 5 Thus, where a defendant seller
supplies powder cocaine, the undercover officers request that the defendant cook
the cocaine to form crack cocaine, and the defendant willingly cooks the cocaine,
Application Note Twelve is silent on any grounds for departure.
In essence, the Ninth Circuit, the only circuit to apply sentencing entrapment,
has inflated the scope of the application notes to serve as a flimsy basis for a broader
sentencing entrapment defense. In so doing, the court has taken an activist approach
that infringes on the proper role of the legislature.216 Justice Owen Roberts's concur-
ring opinion in Sorrells over seven decades ago seems particularly apt with regard
to the Ninth Circuit's adoption of sentencing entrapment, as the court's reasoning
truly seems to be "a strained and unwarranted construction of the statute; [which]
amounts, in fact, to judicial amendment. ' 217 As the Seventh Circuit recently noted,
"no matter what the policy reason for doing so, a court may not rewrite a statute or
guideline to suit its or any other needs. 218 If the court disapproves of the govern-
ment conduct, perhaps it can simply exclude the evidence, an approach suggested
by the First Circuit.219 However, the courts must defer to the legislature to deter-
mine punishment for crimes. Fairness, the central premise of sentencing entrapment,
is not an adequate ground for departing from the will of the people, as seen through
the legislation enacted by their representatives.
211 See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
212 LaBine, supra note 19 at 1530-32.
213 See 2005 MANUAL, supra note 56, §2D 1.1 cmt. 14.
214 Id. at cmt. 12.
215 Application Note Twelve mentions only "quantity" of drugs and not the type or severity
of the substances. Id.
216 Labine, supra note 19, at 1536 ("By accepting the defense, they have passed from saying
what the law is ... to making new laws, an action outside their granted power.").
217 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 456 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
211 United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2003).
219 United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992) ("We are confident that, should
a sufficiently egregious case appear, the sentencing court has ample power to deal with the situ-
ation.., by excluding the tainted transaction from the computation of relevant conduct .... ").
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D. Foreign Jurisprudence
Scholars and courts have often been torn on whether American courts should
look to foreign judiciaries for guidance,220 and this issue was hotly debated recently
before the Supreme Court.221 While the decisions of courts in foreign jurisdictions
naturally are not binding on our courts, such decisions andjudicial perspectives never-
theless can hold persuasive value for American courts grappling with contentious
issues and controversial doctrines.
First of all, the subjective formulation of entrapment is predominantly an American
doctrine. 2 Few other countries accept entrapment as a defense, 3 much less sentenc-
22ing entrapment. z Frequently, foreign jurisdictions find that the appropriate remedy
is to attack the police practice and to curb the behavior of the law enforcement agents
via the criminal law. 2 5 The Australian High Court has held that "law enforcement
agents who engage in criminal activity are criminally liable for their actions and liable
to punishment accordingly."
2 26
220 See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743 (2005).
221 Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-79 (2005) (relying in part on inter-
national laws and norms in deciding to abolish the death penalty as applied to juvenile offend-
ers), with id. at 1603-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222 See Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Per-
spective, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1501, 1521-22 (2002).
Defining entrapment subjectively rather than objectively, the American test
largely focuses on the offender's predisposition. Even powerful induce-
ments will fall short of entrapment if the offender is predisposed to commit
the crime. By contrast, the offender's predispositions are less important to
European legal systems that focus on the undercover agent's complicity.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
223 See, e.g., Ridgeway v. The Queen, (1995) 184 CLR 19, 71-72 (opinion of Gaudron,
J.) (noting that Australian cases consistently hold "that there is no substantive defence of
entrapment," and that "[i]nsanity and duress aside, the criminal law has developed in this and
other common law countries on the basis that criminal liability attaches if a person intends
to commit a crime and actually commits it." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
224 England has alluded to the possibility of decreasing a sentence on entrapment grounds.
See Kate O'Hanlon, Law Report: Entrapment by Journalists Mitigated Sentence, INDEP.
(London), Feb. 20, 1998, at 17 ("Although it was legitimate for police officers to entrap
criminals, even in those circumstances some mitigation of the sentence was possible."). Still,
this is not surprising as the traditional entrapment defense in the United States had its roots,
in part, in English common law, even though most English judges rejected and, indeed, con-
tinue to reject, entrapment claims. See MARCUS, supra note 27, § 1.02, at 2.
225 See Ross, supra note 222, at 1522 ("European legal systems treat such conduct as crimi-
nal unless a law expressly exempts the investigator from liability for specified acts." (citation
omitted)).
226 Ridgeway, 184 CLR at 73. Some American judges and commentators have suggested
such an approach. In the Sixth Amendment context, for example, Chief Justice Burger criticized
the majority's exclusion of evidence: "It continues the Court - by the narrowest margin -
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Not only have foreign courts demonstrated hostility toward the substantive defense
of entrapment, few courts have been willing to even reduce a defendant's sentence
because of entrapment. As the England and Wales Court of Appeals, Criminal Divi-
sion, stated: "[W]here undercover officers purchase drugs from a willing seller there
is no entrapment which requires the court to discount the sentence.... [I]n circum-
stances such as this it might be said to be a case of seller beware." '227 Similarly, Cana-
dian courts have refused to decrease a sentence on entrapment grounds.228
Entrapment has found little support outside the United States, and sentencing
entrapment has encountered even less success. Nevertheless, some foreign courts
will provide relief to a defendant where the government conduct has violated notions
ofjustice and fairness and where, as a result of improper governmental action, the de-
fendant has not received a fair trial. One factor in determining the impropriety of
the government conduct is the presence of individualized, reasonable suspicion prior
to the setting of the trap.229 This seems to indicate that the intent of the government
officials is significant for some courts outside of the United States for determining
whether an investigation was outrageous and undeserving ofjudicial system approval.
E. Public Policy
Part of what drives some courts to adopt sentencing entrapment has been a deep
distrust of police tactics designed to detect and deter criminal behavior. Several
judges have publicly expressed concern over the practice of traditional and reverse
stings,23° the police tactic commonly associated with sentencing entrapment claims.
However, as Justice Roberts cautioned in Sorrells v. United States, "[s]ociety is at
war with the criminal classes, and courts have uniformly held that in waging this
warfare the forces of prevention and detection may use traps, decoys, and deception
to obtain evidence of the commission of crime."23' As a policy matter, recognizing
the doctrine of sentencing entrapment would frustrate police efforts in the war on
drugs. Should other courts follow the Ninth Circuit's lead and distort the intent of
on the much-criticized course of punishing the public for the mistakes and misdeeds of law
enforcement officers, instead of punishing the officer directly, if in fact he is guilty of wrong-
doing." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415-16 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
227 R. v. Thornton, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 919 (Transcript: Smith), 23 (Mar 19, 2003).
228 See, e.g., The Queen v. Sugden, [1991] O.A.C. 20,1 13 ("The one year sentence imposed
is, if anything, lenient and fully reflects the mitigating factors outlined in detail by the trial
judge.").
229 S v. Mkonto, High Court, 2001 (4) BCLR 401 (C) (describing the statutory provision
by which a court, in deciding whether the government conduct went beyond merely providing
an opportunity, must determine "'whether, before the trap was set or the undercover operation
was used, there existed any suspicion, entertained upon reasonable grounds, that the accused
had committed an offence similar to that to which the charge relates').
230 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
231 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,453-54 (1932) (Roberts, J., dissenting in part).
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the Sentencing Commission,232 police officers maybe inclined to only conduct sting
operations with the aim of purchasing smaller quantities of drugs. This would surely
be an unfortunate consequence and a distinct setback for the war on drugs, as greater
amounts of drugs would remain on the streets and drug dealers would stand a better
chance of avoiding upper-level mandatory minimums.
In a Sixth Amendment case, Justice White criticized the majority, stating, "I do
not share this pervasive distrust of all official investigations. 2 33 The adoption of
sentencing entrapment by several federal courts and the handful of state courts has
exemplified their pervasive and unfounded distrust of government agents and their
efforts in fighting crime. Concerning sentencing entrapment, in particular, the First
Circuit warned, "Courts should go very slowly before staking out rules that will
deter government agents from the proper performance of their investigative duties."234
F. Philosophy of Punishment
The rationale underlying sentencing entrapment also runs counter to the pre-
vailing goals of criminal sentencing. In authorizing the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate the Sentencing Guidelines, Congress identified four objectives for criminal
sentencing: incapacitation,.deterrence, just punishment, and rehabilitation.2 35 Under-
lying the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimums, however, seems to be
a reflection of the changing goals of criminal sentencing, specifically, the shift away
from rehabilitation and towards incapacitation, deterrence, and punishment. As Justice
Breyer described while serving as a commissioner on the Sentencing Commission,
the Commission had to find a compromise between "those who advocated 'just
deserts' but could not produce a convincing, objective way to rank [the seriousness
of] criminal behavior in detail, and on the other hand, with those who advocated
'deterrence' but had no convincing empirical data linking detailed and small vari-
ations in punishment to prevention of crime." '236
While the federal sentencing scheme and the sentencing laws of several states
have been criticized for drawing quantitative distinctions in sentencing for drug
crimes,237 "the public, the voters who asked for these laws in the first place, over-
whelmingly favor mandatory minimums.""23 As then-Congressman Asa Hutchinson
stated in a debate at the Georgetown University Law Center, "[T]he public has to
232 See supra notes 200-215 and accompanying text.
233 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 252 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part).
234 United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992).
231 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2001).
236 See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 19, 32-33
(2003) (quoting Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromise
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 17 (1988) (alteration in original).
237 See, e.g., Witten, supra note 9, 706-09.
238 Debate, supra note 77, at 1281 (statement of Cokie Roberts).
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have a means of expressing its outrage toward certain offenses that are so harmful
to the public." '239 Reflecting the shift in the philosophical basis for sentencing,
Congressman Hutchinson conspicuously omitted any mention of rehabilitation
while applauding the efficacy of mandatory minimums.24 °
Sentencing entrapment operates against these societal preferences. Citizens,
through their representatives, have chosen to severely punish those who deal in large
quantities of controlled substances. Whether a judge thinks a defendant was not
"predisposed" to commit such a severe drug violation should not matter. Whether
a judge believes a defendant could benefit from a sentence premised on rehabili-
tation is equally irrelevant. The sentence has been provided by the Sentencing
Commission and state legislatures. The political process has chosen incapacitation,
deterrence, and punishment as the primary bases for criminal sentencing, and it is
not for a judge to circumvent popular will by decreasing a sentence on grounds of
sentencing entrapment.
G. Individual Responsibility
Finally, sentencing entrapment ignores the notion that everyone is responsible
for their actions and their own destiny.24' In response to a sentencing entrapment
claim, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals placed great importance on the notion
of individual responsibility and stated rather succinctly, "The government is not the
cause of Guereca's predicament: Guereca is. ' ' 24 2 The basic premise of the sentenc-
ing entrapment defense is that an individual who was predisposed to committing
only minor offenses is entrapped by the government into committing a more severe
offense subject to greater penalties. Contrary to the contention of sentencing entrap-
ment proponents, however, drug dealers are not presented with some sort of Hobson' s
Choice. Such offenders can choose to deal in small quantities and risk relatively
short imprisonment or even probation, or they can choose to deal in quantities that
our elected representatives have seen fit to punish more severely.24 3 Similarly, the
decision made by a cocaine dealer to deal in crack instead of cocaine is not afait
accompli, regardless of how easy it may be to cook powder cocaine into crack.
Should a drug dealer cook cocaine in the microwave, he actively made the decision
to deal a more addictive, more dangerous, and more reprehensible drug. He may
239 Id. at 1282.
240 Id. ("And so I think the retribution theory is supported. I believe the deterrence theory
is supported.").
241 See John H. Pearson, Comment, Mandatory Advisory Counselfor Pro Se Defendants:
Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CAL. L. REv. 697, 701 (1984) ("It is a fun-
damental tenet of American culture that individuals are responsible for shaping their own
destinies." (citing JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST bk. I, lines 258-63 (1667))).
242 United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1996).
243 Naturally, a third and more desirable option would be for such individuals to exit the
drug market entirely.
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not like the prospect of spending more time in prison, but his decision was not a
foregone conclusion, and courts should adhere to the consequences of offenders
acting of their own free will. As Benjamin Disraeli once wrote: "Next to knowing
when to seize an opportunity,.. . the most important thing in life is to know when
to forego an advantage."" These defendants were presented with an opportunity
that violated our laws, an opportunity that should not have been seized, an advantage
that should have been foregone.
The facts surrounding sentencing entrapment cases are often troubling, and it
is understandable that some judges may feel sympathy for drug dealers facing longer
sentences. However, that compassion ought to have its limits, as the judges are
charged with enforcing the laws established by duly elected representatives of the
citizenry. If a sentence is unconstitutional, that is one thing. If a sentence merely
seems harsh, however, it is left to the legislature, not the court, to dictate what is
fair in the context of our criminal justice system.245 When defendants raise claims
of sentencing entrapment based on predisposition, it is they who are "shouting into
the wind."'24 It is only a shame that some courts, whose sympathetic ears have over-
powered their better judgment, have listened.247
IV. EVALUATING SENTENCING MANIPULATION
Unlike sentencing entrapment, sentencing manipulation is based on outrageous
government conduct 248 or "'extraordinary misconduct.' 249 Instead of being rooted
244 DISRAELI THE YOUNGER, THE INFERNAL MARRIAGE 51 (William Jackson (Books) Ltd.
1929) (1834).
25 A similar criticism was recently raised by Justice Scalia: "The Court thus proclaims
itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards... ." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Regardless of what a court may feel is the "right" thing
to do, "[in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will
and consequently the moral values of the people." Id. at 616 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
246 David M. Zlotnick, Shouting Into the Wind: District Court Judges and Federal Senten-
cing Policy, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 645, 645 (2004).
247 Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 298 n.16 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
(citing 149 CONG. REc. S5113, S5121-S5122 (Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Senator Hatch contends that the PROTECT Act
says the game is over for judges: You will have some departure guide-
lines from the Sentencing Commission, but you are not going to go
beyond those, and you are not going to go on doing what is happening
in our society today on children's crimes, no matter how softhearted
you are. That is what we are trying to do here .... We say in this bill:
We are sick of this, judges. You are not going to do this anymore except
within the guidelines set by the Sentencing Commission.
Id. (omission in original).
248 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).
249 Id.
1616 [Vol. 14:1583
MISNAMED, MISAPPLIED, AND MISGUIDED
in entrapment, which the Supreme Court has grounded on a defendant's predispo-
sition, this doctrine finds its foundation in outrageous government misconduct, a
substantive defense to a crime based on notions of due process.25° In essence, when
a defendant raises a claim of sentencing manipulation, he is acknowledging that he
is guilty of a crime but that the outrageous misconduct of the officers caused him
to commit a more severe crime, thereby violating his right to due process. While
not a perfect doctrine, sentencing manipulation has found greater support in the federal
courts 51 and avoids many of the infirmities that plague sentencing entrapment.5 2
A. Balancing Costs and Benefits of Sting Operations
First, sentencing manipulation, more so than the subjective approach that consti-
tutes sentencing entrapment, effectively balances the benefits of reverse stings and
undercover law enforcement with the dangers of excessive police conduct in shaping
the offense and punishment. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court acknowledged,
[t]he benefits of reverse sting operations, i.e., ferreting out those
who are ready, willing and able to engage in crime, must be bal-
anced against the danger of granting law enforcement officials
unlimited power to define the scope of criminal culpability in a
given case. The fact that a single officer in the field can determine
the amount of drugs in a case, and, therefore, the length of sen-
tence for a defendant, is a troubling scenario. Such awesome power
cannot go unchecked.253
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania court adopted the objective version of sentencing
entrapment: sentencing manipulation. Through a balancing of interests, courts will
be better able to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system while still ensur-
ing just deserts for those who violate the law.
B. Less Statutory Conflict and Greater Deference to Legislature
Additionally, where there is a constitutional violation, such as a violation of due
process, the Court can avoid the confines of a statute. Thus, while a particular sen-
tence may be valid on its face, such a sentence may nevertheless be invalid under
250 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) ("[W]e may some day be
presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
251 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
22 See supra Part Ill (discussing the flaws of the subjective doctrine of sentencing entrapment).
253 Commonwealth v. Petzold, 701 A.2d 1363, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
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due process when applied to a defendant who has been the target of outrageous
police conduct.2 4 Where a constitutional right has been violated, the courts can cir-
cumvent legislation, including sentencing laws, and indeed, when sentencing mani-
pulation has been found by courts, the courts should disregard applicable sentencing
and sentence the defendant to a reasonable 255 term of imprisonment that comports
with the goals of criminal sentencing.25 6
C. Guidance to Police and Other Government Officials
Furthermore, a downward departure from sentencing laws based on government
misconduct will provide more adequate guidance to government agents structuring
their investigations. Cases such as Ramirez-Rangel257 will gain greater precedential
value when officers learn that they cannot hand a defendant a black bag with guns
without actually telling the defendant that the bag contains machine guns.258 Only
under a rubric of sentencing manipulation can officers know that every time they
engage in certain prohibited investigatory conduct, their conduct will be found
outrageous by a court and the sentence they attempted to manipulate will in fact be
decreased by the court. Where the focus is on the individual defendant and her
predisposition, as is the focus of sentencing entrapment, government agents are left
wondering what will happen if they conduct an identical investigation with a differ-
ent suspected criminal. By providing a convicted criminal with a lesser sentence,
the courts can appropriately deter government behavior that falls outside the bounds
of justice, fairness and due process.
V. THE PROPER TEST
Sentencing manipulation could potentially open the door to courts micromanag-
ing and over-scrutinizing government conduct. As has been noted, such a doctrine
254 Cf. Leonard N. Sosnov, Separation of Powers Shell Game: The Federal Witness Immu-
nity Act, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 171, 214 (2000) ("If a court has power in this area .... it is because
the court has the independent constitutional authority and obligation under Article III to
disregard the statute and enforce a defendant's due process.., rights.").
255 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-61 (2005) (setting a reasonableness
standard of review for departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
256 See supra Part III.F.
257 See United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1997).
258 As the Ninth Circuit stated,
The question may be different in cases like the present one, however.
If the defendants did not initially bargain for machine guns in return for
drugs, and the government supplied machine guns in a covered bag, it
is possible that the defendants neither agreed nor knew that machine
guns were involved.... The government ought not to be able to commit
an entire act for a defendant without the defendant's knowledge, in order
to increase a penalty by 25 years.
Id. at 1507.
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risks putting the law enforcement officers on trial and detracting attention away from
the defendant who is actually before the court.259 As the argument goes, determining
the motives of the law enforcement agents and agencies may be relevant when it is the
agents and agencies on trial, but not when the individual defendant is facing sentencing.
Those courts and commentators that are hesitant to examine the intent and
motives of government officials may be correct that such an analysis would shift the
focus in trial away from the defendant and onto the police. Perhaps that is a desir-
able consequence, however. If police and other undercover agents are allowed to
use stings and traps to catch criminals, it is not unreasonable to ask them to explain
their actions. If they cannot present a legitimate reason for their actions, the sentence
should, in turn, be diminished. Police should support their investigative actions, and
in instances when they cannot do so, it is apparent that the long arm of big brother
simply has extended too far. 60 When the government overreaches like this, it the obli-
gation of thejudiciary to not condone such behavior and to reject the lengthy sentence
that the government sought to obtain. Accordingly, two possible formulations of
a viable sentencing manipulation doctrine exist: one that is intent-based and the other
that is market-based.
A. Intent-Based Standard of Sentencing Manipulation
While all of the federal courts have at least acknowledged that sentencing entrap-
ment claims exist, it was a state court - the Third District of the Florida Court of
Appeals - that came the closest to framing a viable test for challenges to sentences.
That court stated that the focus should be on law enforcement intent: "[W]as the
sting operation continued only to enhance the defendant's sentence or did legitimate
law enforcement reasons exist to support the police conduct, such as to determine
the extent of the criminal enterprise, to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, or to uncover any co-conspirators?""26 Courts presented with such claims
should avoid the issue of the predisposition of the defendant and should instead focus
on the intent of the government official and the "purpose and flagrancy of the official
259 See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct, 37
CONN. L. REv. 67, 100 (2004) ("Some have also argued that it puts the police on trial and
simply stalls the proceedings against the defendant, bogging down in a swearing match between
the police and the defendant about what really happened.... ."); see also United States v. Jones,
18 F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting any "rule that would require district courts to
speculate as to the motives of, or to ascribe motives to, law enforcement authorities").
260 This is such a concern that it is difficult for some courts and commentators to express
approval for sentencing entrapment in the first place. See, e.g., Saul M. Pilchen, The Underside
of Undercover Operations, CONN. L. TRIB., July 22, 1991, at 18 ("Big brother has gone big
time .... It seems all the world's a stage for the federal government as it pursues scores of
undercover sting operations in its battle against crime.").
261 State v. Steadman, 827 So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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misconduct., 26 2 The Florida court's rationale for the intent standard was that it
"prevents sentence manipulation for the purpose of enhancing punishment, does not
interfere with undercover operations, and does not excuse a defendant. '263 Thus,
when a defendant is caught in a sting operation, the court should not plunge hope-
lessly into a morass of evidentiary dilemmas, trying to establish what the defendant
had done in the past and what the defendant would have done but for the actions of
the undercover agents. Rather, should a defendant wish to challenge the sentence
established for the crime that he duly committed, he should bear the initial burden
of challenging the government's intent in the investigation. The burden should then
shift to the government to prove that the agents did not continue their actions "for
the sole purpose of ratcheting up a sentence."26
The question then becomes what burden is to be placed on the government to
justify the heightened sentence. Because predisposition would not be a factor under
this analysis, placing a heightened burden of proof on the government to justify its
actions would provide further assurance that the resulting sentence is appropriate
and just. Accordingly, this Note argues that the government should be required to prove
by clear and convincing evidence,2 65 not just by a preponderance of the evidence,
that each action that incriminates the defendant subsequent to the first undercover
encounter be justified for reasons other than increasing the defendant's sentence. By
requiring the government to justify its actions, the concerns of some scholars that
low-level criminals, as opposed to the "'big fish,"'266 are being targeted may be
alleviated.267 A defendant's liberty is at stake, and the government ought to be able
262 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,604 (1975) (evaluating government misconduct in the
Fourth Amendment context).
263 Steadman, 827 So. 2d at 1025.
264 United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993).
265 Cf McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (upholding the preponderance
of the evidence standard where there was no allegation that the sentencing enhancement was
"a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense"). Where sentencing manipulation is
raised, there is just such a risk that the tail will wag the dog. Accordingly, several circuits,
notably those that have adopted the doctrine of sentencing entrapment, have required a height-
ened standard of proof for sentencing factors where a substantial difference in potential sen-
tences is at stake. See United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1991) ("At the
very least, McMillan allows for the possibility that the preponderance standard the Court
approved for garden variety sentencing determinations may fail to comport with due process
where, as here, a sentencing enhancement factor becomes 'a tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense."' (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88)); United States v. Restrepo, 946
F.2d 654,656 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (acknowledging the heightened standard of proof
employed in other circuits where there exists the potential for an extraordinary upward adjust-
ment in a sentence), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 961 (1992).
266 See Witten, supra note 9, at 727.
267 Id. at 727-28 ("'Instead of imposing more severe penalties on the "big fish," smaller
criminals frequently receive the brunt of the stricter punishments."' (quoting Robert Eldridge
Underhill, Sentence Entrapment: A Casualty of the War on Crime, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
165, 192)); id. at 729 ("'Instead of capturing crime kingpins, sentence entrapment injures only
the small-time, street-level criminal."' (quoting Underhill, supra, at 194)).
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to demonstrate the necessity of continuing an investigation that potentially will result
in a greater deprivation of liberty for the particular defendant.
If the government is able to carry its burden by clear and convincing evidence
that it possessed legitimate reasons for its investigative tactics, beyond merely
increasing the criminal penalty for the defendant, then the burden could shift back
to the defendant. At this stage, the defendant could show that regardless of the govern-
ment's intent or motivation in the operation, the government's conduct was simply
so outrageous that due process must be invoked to preclude enforcement of the full
sentence.268 The standard should be high here, however, for once the government
has shown legitimate intent, the judiciary should remove itself from excessively
scrutinizing executive action.269
By embodying notions of due process, such an analysis for sentencing entrap-
ment or manipulation cases would preserve the integrity of the judicial process
while still providing judges with the discretion to depart from the guidelines when
the fundamental concepts of justice and fairness so dictate. Such an approach will
also ensure that both overreaching by the government and sentencing disparities by
the courts are contained. Finally, this analysis may place a higher burden on the
government to justify its actions, but it nevertheless enables police and government
agents to continue employing the same tactics in their war on drugs and other
crimes. 21
°
B. Market-Based Standard of Sentencing Manipulation
An alternative to the intent-based framework - and one that hitherto has not
been considered by any court - is a market-based standard. Rather than looking
to the intent of the government agents, which may pose its own evidentiary diffi-
culties, courts should evaluate government conduct as it relates to the economic
forces governing the illegal drug market. In short, government agents should not
be able to manipulate a sentence by deviating from market norms.
268 See, e.g., United States v. Snow, 309 F.3d 294, 295 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring out-
rageous conduct for a cognizable defense to a sentence).
269 See Stevenson, supra note 259, at 100 (noting the prevalent "skepticism about the courts
acting as the morality police for law enforcement agencies").
270 As some scholars have pointed out:
[Ilt is possible that a society could simply prohibit all sting operations,
acquitting the defendant at the slightest hint of government solicitation
or involvement, which would obviate the need for either test. This would
force the police to rely instead on surveillance ex ante and investigation
ex post of the commission of crimes.
Id. at 90 n.94. Since society has not prohibited such tactics and such tactics have been proven
quite effective, this standard will allow police to continue using them, provided their intent
and motives are legitimate.
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As a threshold matter, it scarcely can be doubted that, taken together, the import-
ing, producing, selling, buying, and using of illegal drugs constitutes an ongoing
market.27' Naturally, the illegal drug market is in many regards unlike conventional
and legal markets,272 such as the buying and selling of goods, services, stocks, etc.
Nonetheless, it is a vibrant market, and as the normal means of prosecuting the drug
war have not always been successful in curbing this market, 73 many jurisdictions
and law enforcement agencies have altered their mindsets and approaches. For exam-
ple, multiple states have begun imposing market liability on convicted drug dealers.274
It is a universal275 goal that criminal activity should be rooted out and punished.276
While perhaps not all criminal activity may be categorized as part of a market, surely
there is a drug market, and if police are to play within this market by going under-
cover to root out criminals and criminal behavior, then they ought to abide by the
rules of the market.277 When playing within the rules governing the drug market,
271 For example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has used market termi-
nology to evaluate the progress of the drug war in America. See David Adams, GAO: Data
Too Fuzzy to Measure Drug War, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Dec. 24, 2005, at LA (analyzing
the "'illicit drug market' and noting that "[iut's an illegal trade after all, and no one on Wall
Street is tracking its performance."). Some have even used the market terminology to refer
to a drug industry. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug
Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995).
272 But see Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REv. 383, 398 n.82 (1995) ("'In some areas of Los Angeles, the scene re-
sembles a public market, with competing dealers loudly hawking their wares on the sidewalk....'
(quoting PETER D. ScoTr & JONATHAN MARSHALL, COCAINE PoLrrIcs: DRUGS, ARMIES AND
THE CIA IN CENTRAL AMERICA at x (1991))).
273 See Sylvaine Poret, Paradoxical Effects ofLaw Enforcement Policies: The Case ofthe
Illicit Drug Market, 22 INT'L REv. L. & ECON 465, 482 (2002) ("[R]etailers and traffickers
react strategically to a tougher law enforcement policy by taking costs related to the law
enforcement into account and adapt the number of transactions they make or the quantity
exchanged at the time of a transaction.").
274 See generally Wendy Stasell, Comment, "Shopping "for Defendants: Market Liability
Under the Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act, 27 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 1023 (1996); Joel W. Baar,
Note, Let the Drug Dealer Beware: Market-Share Liability in Michiganforthe Injuries Caused
by the Illegal Drug Market, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 139 (1997).
27 With the exception of those engaging in criminal activities, of course.
276 See, e.g., Ridgeway v. The Queen [1995], 184 CLR 19,51 ('It is desirable in the public
interest that crime should be detected and punished."').
277 I recognize the apparent contradiction of requiring government agents to abide by the
rules of a market they ultimately hope to destroy. Nonetheless, the market will remain so long
as there is a demand for recreational drugs. See Robert Sharpe, Applying Market Principles
to Drug Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2002, at A20. Simply put, it is not up to law enforce-
ment officers to curb the demand for narcotics; that task falls to policy-makers, educators, health
professionals, parents, and other individuals capable of effecting an influence on potential users.
Law enforcement officers can, at least, affect the supply, but in doing so, they should act in
accordance with the normal market forces.
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government agents can be more certain to trap the truly criminally inclined - those
who would violate the law with the same frequency and to the same severity in the
absence of police involvement - rather than low-level drug dealers who may be
unable to resist an unreasonably good deal.27 When deviating from that market,
however, government agents are effectively creating the criminal activity, which is
seen as going beyond the bounds of acceptable government behavior.279 Put another
way, by stepping outside the rules of the drug market, the police are "improperly
enlarg[ing] the scope or scale of the crime,"2 ' behavior that the Supreme Court has
condemned.
So what, then, are the "rules" of the drug market? What qualifies as falling within
that market, and conversely, what police tactics would fall outside the normal oper-
ations of the drug market? The facts surrounding numerous sentencing entrapment
claims would seemingly fall within the confines of the illicit drug market. Drug
dealers and traffickers typically carry firearms and other weapons with them during
the ordinary course of their business.2"' Receiving a heightened sentence because,
during the course of a drug deal, they carried a firearm, either of their own accord
or on the suggestion of an undercover officer, in no way exceeds the normal bounds
of the drug market, and accordingly, such a defendant should not receive a dimin-
ished or mitigated sentence for that reason alone. Another common argument employed
by defendants caught in traditional and reverse sting operations is that the govern-
ment agents continued the investigation and the series of controlled purchases and
sales long after sufficient evidence had been obtained to convict the defendant.
Essentially, such defendants argue that the agents should have ceased the inves-
tigation, rather than continuing the operation, which in turn resulted in larger amounts
of drugs exchanging hands and, consequently, longer prison sentences for the defen-
dants. Here, though, there is no circumvention of the market rules; indeed, the police
are playing perfectly within the rules and appear no different than any other repeat
player in the market.
The crucial question is when government agents go outside of the normal drug
market and attempt to change the market from within. The Sentencing Commission
itself noted one tactic of government agents that violates the rules of the drug market
- setting unreasonably low prices as a seller.282 By pricing below market prices,
prices that are otherwise dictated by supply and demand, the agents have gone outside
278 Certainly, it has been noted "that drug dealing (like other crimes) disproportionately
attracts those high in impulsivity and low in self-control." Caulkins & MacCoun, supra note
4, at 321 (citation omitted).
279 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,451 (1932) (condemning illegal conduct that
is the "product of the creative activity of [government] officials").
280 United States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2004).
21 See United States v. Conyers, 118 F.3d 755,757 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhose who transport
drugs often carry (and all too often use) a firearm .. .
282 See supra note 204.
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the norms of the drug market and are prosecuting behavior that presumably would
not otherwise have occurred. An additional example would be giving things away,
such as guns or drugs, particularly without the criminal's knowledge or consent. 283
Nothing comes free, especially in black markets, and when police officers give contra-
band to unwary persons, only to turn around and prosecute them for that possession,
the police have overstepped the bounds of the normal drug market and have, in
essence, created the very crime they seek to prosecute.
A police tactic that might be a closer call, however, is the practice of fronting
purchase money for the drugs. Such a practice may be relatively common in the
drug market, and indeed, $300 of the $800 purchase price was fronted by the police
in State v. Foster.284 However, fronting money only pushes the actions of the govern-
ment agents themselves closer to the criminal line. In the drug market, there certainly
is no such thing as a purchase money security interest in cocaine, so fronting money
is essentially done on an honor system. Should one fail to repay, however, the purc-
haser may be faced with the risk of violence to his person, his property, or even his
loved ones. When a purchaser of drugs asks and receives permission to borrow the
purchase money, he undoubtedly is cognizant of those risks inherent in failing to
pay his supplier. Accordingly, by fronting money to unwitting purchasers of drugs,
government agents are implicitly threatening the lives and/or property of the targets
of their sting operations, and such coercive, threatening behavior by government
agents seems to cross the line between acceptable investigatory tactics and conduct
that the courts should not tolerate. Indeed, the notion that police officers are threat-
ening the lives of the drug purchasers should rise to the level of a due process viola-
tion. Thus, while the market-based approach may condemn this police tactic, it certain-
ly should not survive an outrageous government conduct claim.
A market-based standard of sentencing manipulation may prove easier for courts
to apply, but that is not the only benefit of such a conception of the doctrine. It also
may provide clearer guidance to law enforcement officers,285 which in turn would
adversely affect the drug market. The market operates within a set of consistent rules,
and by conducting investigations in accordance with those rules, government agents
are less likely to attract the suspicion of courts concerned about overreaching.286
Additionally, at the street level, if government agents play by the market's rules, the
risk of their investigatory schemes being detected will decrease, and consequently,
283 E.g., United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1997).
284 592 S.E.2d 259 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); see supra text accompanying note 13.
285 This may alleviate some of the concerns expressed in Part III.E.
286 To quote a recent film: "And he was the rarest breed of law enforcement officer - the
type who knew I was breaking the law but wouldn't break it himself to bust me." LORD OF
WAR (Lions Gate 2006). Such a "breed" of police officer should not be so rare, and in a
system embracing the market-based standard of sentencing manipulation, law enforcement
officers are less likely to "create" crimes as they will simply be abiding by the rules of the
drug market. With courts less suspicious of sting operations and law enforcement practices,
conviction rates may well increase, which in turn will improve the efficacy of the drug war.
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the costs to drug dealers will increase.2 87 By restricting the supply through effective
drug interdiction efforts, thus increasing the market price of drugs on the street,
some suppliers will be forced out of the market and some users will lose their
suppliers. These indirect effects of a market-based standard of sentencing manipu-
lation would go a long way in accomplishing the goal of sting operations and the drug
war as a whole. 88
As an economic approach has been taken by other scholars with regards to tra-
ditional entrapment, 89 there seems to be little standing in the way of a similar frame-
work for sentencing manipulation. A market-based analysis, just as much as an analysis
of the intent of police officers, may yield the optimal results in sentencing entrapment
jurisprudence, particularly when acting in conjunction with other constitutional
protections such as due process via the outrageous government conduct defense.
VI. FUTURE OF SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND MANIPULATION
The Supreme Court would be wise to resolve the controversy over sentencing
entrapment and sentencing manipulation. The Supreme Court frequently takes cases
when the courts of appeals are divided on an issue, 290 and here, the circuits are split
on whether the doctrine should be applied and, if so, how. Some courts use the
phrase "sentencing entrapment," other courts say "sentencing manipulation," and
still others refer to the concept as "sentencing factor manipulation." Some courts
287 Cf Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, The Economic Case Against Drug Prohibition,
9. J. EcON. PERSP. 175, 176 (1995) ("Enforcement and potential legal punishment effectively
impose a 'tax' on suppliers, thereby raising the costs of supplying drugs. This tax includes
the jail sentences and fines that drug suppliers face if apprehended, along with any costs that
suppliers incur in evading detection.").
288 Cf Juan Forero, Cocaine Prices Rise and Quality Declines, White House Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at A 12 (noting that the drugs prices have increased, the purity of drugs
has decreased, and as a result, "[t]here's a change in availability. The policy is working.").
289 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFTHE LAW 231 (6th ed. 2003); see
also Elbaz, supra note 200. Elbaz sets forth an efficiency-maximizing analysis for entrapment:
The efficient approach provides that entrapment strategies should exist
only where the tactics supply reliable evidence that a target would
engage in the crime under ordinary circumstances and such tactics yield
a marginal increase in deterrence levels. If an entrapment strategy yields
neither result, it is inefficient, and the entrapment defense should be
considered applicable.
Id. at 143.
290 See Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective
Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 109, 128 n. 119 (1995)
("Public controversy over unusual published appellate decisions or a split between circuits
is sometimes the only way to attract enough attention to obtain certiorari." (emphasis
added)); see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (discussing the division in
the lower courts on the effect on subsequent confessions on intentional violations of Miranda
requirements designed to elicit an initial confession).
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feel that sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation are synonymous,"'
while other courts distinguish the two as separate defenses.292 States are equally con-
fused by the doctrine and have taken varying approaches to such claims. 293 The
doctrines of sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation present unique
challenges to the application of federal and state sentencing laws, and the Court has
recently addressed challenges to federal and state sentencing guidelines.2' The time
is ripe for the Supreme Court to address this controversial concept.
In addition to the legal confusion over the doctrine, the Court should address
sentencing entrapment because of the liberty interests at stake; put simply, Supreme
Court approval or rejection of sentencing entrapment defenses can result in substantial
differences in the prison sentences for future defendants..2 " Furthermore, the same
government conduct by government agents in neighboring states can result in two
starkly different sentences for violation of the same federal laws. It is imperative
that the Supreme Court step in to prevent such disparities and to resolve the ongoing
dispute over sentencing in the context of undercover operations.
CONCLUSION
The presence of rigid, if not mandatory, 29 sentencing laws has allowed the poten-
tial for governmental abuse and manipulation of criminal sentencing, and commen-
tators that are critical of such sentencing schemes are entirely correct that "sting
operations create, at least, the potential for injustices in sentencing. '"97 Neverthe-
less, "a crook is a crook is a crook,, 29' and courts should not countenance crime by
casually departing from sentencing laws, thereby providing convicted criminals
with shelter from the punishment deemed appropriate by elected representatives.
Sentencing entrapment has a certain attractiveness to it, but any such appeal must
be discounted by the utter subjectivity and indeterminateness that such widespread
application of the doctrine will undoubtedly wreak on sentencing in the federal and
291 See, e.g., United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003).
292 See, e.g., United States v. Atwater, 336 F. Supp. 2d 626, 629 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("The
sentencing manipulation theory is separate and distinct from its close cousin the 'sentencing en-
trapment' theory.").
293 See supra Part II.B.
294 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
295 Unlike deprivation of the right to counsel, however, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), this issue is not likely to be considered fundamental enough to warrant retroactive
application. Cf. Booker, 543 U.S. 220.
m9 Booker, 543 U.S. 220.
297 Saul M. Pilchen, supra note 260.
29' LaBine, supra note 19, at 1519 (quoting Letters to the Editor, NEWswEEK, Mar. 3, 1980,
at 5).
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state systems. Where government behavior, however, has fallen below acceptable
standards, intent-based or market-based, the defendant should receive a lesser punish-
ment based on sentencing manipulation. The government should not benefit from
its own misconduct and bad intentions, but neither should a defendant receive a lesser
sentence solely because he was not predisposed to commit such a severe crime. Such
a paradigm will deter inappropriate government behavior and oversee that due process
is preserved, while still ensuring the fulfillment of legislative intent and sentencing
the majority of defendants to their just deserts.
